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ADVERSE POSSESSION, PRIVATE-ZONING WAIVER &
DESUETUDE: ABANDONMENT & RECAPTURE OF
PROPERTY AND LIBERTY INTERESTS
Scott Andrew Shepard*
Adverse-possession doctrine labors under a pair of disabilities: a hesitancy by
theorists to embrace the abandonment-and-recapture principle that informs the
doctrine, and a substantial unwillingness of governments to abandon an an-
tiquated and outmoded maxim shielding them from the doctrine's important
work. Removing these disabilities will allow a series of positive outcomes. First,
it will demonstrate that all would-be adverse possessors, not just those acting
"in good faith" or with possessory intent, should enjoy the fruits of the doc-
trine. Second, it will provide valuable additional means by which the public
may monitor the performance of government employees, and additional disci-
pline to governments tempted to allow their aspirational commitments to
outstrip their fiscal capacities. As an added benefit, it can achieve these ends
without posing any threat to emergent environmental values, while serving as
a positive support for effective government conservation efforts. Moreover, once
adverse possession is recognized as a process of abandonment and recapture,
and is applied to government entities as well as to private, opportunities arise
to employ the doctrine expansively for the protection of property and liberty in-
terests against aggressive overregulation and overcriminalization. The doctrine
can become a tool for tempering and restraining burgeoning zoning and other
property- and liberty-curtailing regulations by declaring regulations that have
gone long unenforced in the face of broad, open public violation to be aban-
doned and unenforceable. Perhaps most intriguingly, it can provide a secure
foundation in the American legal system for the doctrine of desuetude, by which
long-violated and long-unenforced criminal prohibitions lose their restrictive
capacity.
INTRODUCTION
Adverse possession, alternatively described as "a strange and
wonderful system"' and "legalized theft,"' might likeliest be
* The author wrote this Article while a visiting professor at John Marshall Law
School in Chicago, Illinois. He thanks the library staff at John Marshall, particularly Jamie
Sommer, Raizel Liebler, Kimberly Wise, Ramsey Donnell, and Teresa Do, and JMLS student
and research-assistant Beckett Homer, for their tireless and invaluable assistance. Any flaws
in this Article are, of course, solely the responsibility of the author.
1. WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.7, at 853
(3d ed. 2000).
2. See, e.g., Todd Barnet, The Uniform Registered State Land and Adverse Possession Reform
Act, A Proposal for Reform of the United States Real Property Law, 12 BuFF. ENvrL. L.J. 1, 3 (2004)
(adversely possessed property "legally stolen"); Alexandra B. Klass, Adverse Possession and
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thought, in this modern era, "a quiet backwater,"' the relevance
of which is slowly-but surely and inevitably-drying up.
Adverse possession need not and should not fade from rele-
vance this way, though. It and the principles underlying it still do
much good in modern law, and could do much more. If properly
understood and applied, the adverse-possession doctrine and the
principles that inform it can serve as a basis upon which to curb
wasteful government ownership of property, and can render un-
enforceable long-unenforced and long-violated regulations of
property and liberty interests, such as zoning regulations and
criminal prohibitions respectively. Unfortunately, however, the
doctrine labors under a pair of unnecessary disabilities that are
inconsistent with modern legal notions and needs, and that have
consequently obscured the contemporary value and reach of ad-
verse-possession doctrine and theory. These disabilities must be
removed to allow the doctrine to reach fuller modern potential.
The first disability arises from the very way in which the doc-
trine has been described and justified. The standard
explanations and justifications of adverse possession, offered
haltingly and with vague embarrassment, fully account neither
for why the doctrine does what it does nor for why its results are
valid and appropriate. Yet a better-a complete-explanation
and justification is in fact available. Adverse possession is best
understood as a two-stage process: (1) constructive abandonment
by the title owner, followed by (2) possession and ownership-
essentially recapture-of the newly abandoned property by the
adverse possessor. Hesitancy to embrace this model arises, in
part, from an unwillingness to recognize either that land can be
abandoned or that abandonment may and (as a practical matter)
does occur constructively. There exists, however, no sound rea-
son for this hesitancy. In Section I below I work through a
complete theoretical account and justification of adverse posses-
sion, deploying and defending this abandonment-and-recapture
model of the doctrine, and demonstrating the theoretical and
practical advantages that arise from embracing the model.
Section II discusses the second disability under which adverse
possession labors: the continuing assertion, by courts and legisla-
tures alike, of the maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi-the claim
Conservation: Expanding Traditional Notions of Use and Possession, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 288-89
(2006) (citing William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Outlaws of the Past: A Western
Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER L. REv. 79, 94 n.117
(1996)) ("title by theft").
3. Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1122, 1122 (1984).
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that "time does not run against the king"-as a justification for
exempting government-held property from the ambit of adverse-
possession doctrine. Modern governments have abandoned this
manifestly outdated maxim and its first cousin, sovereign im-
munity, in myriad other contexts, ranging from tort and contract
suits against government to statutes of limitations for the prose-
cution of criminal and tax violations. Some scholars have already
argued that the time has long-since passed to abandon it in the
adverse-possession context as well. Building on that scholarship,
in Section II I review and respond to scholars who argue for
maintaining or even expanding the nullum tempus bar to adverse
possession against government-held property. I demonstrate that
applying adverse possession to government-held property will
advance the interests of good and competent government and
coherent resource allocation: first by better aligning govern-
ment's expressed goals with its actual investments; and second,
by providing additional means by which the public can effectively
monitor government functions and take direct action against
government neglect that threatens its communities. Finally, I will
demonstrate that applying adverse possession to government-
held property will not damage, and will in fact enhance, the real-
world prospects of conservation and environmental protection.
Recognizing the abandonment-and-recapture basis of adverse
possession and applying the doctrine to government permits ad-
ditional, novel protections of the public's property and liberty
interests to arise as well. In particular, adverse possession need
not apply only to government ownership of fee-simple property,
nor even to the traditional categories of physical and intangible
property interests alone. Unlike private and non-profit entities,
and unlike the public in its communal-ownership capacity, gov-
ernment has the power to limit, by statute and regulation, the
property and liberty interests of the public at large or of various
segments of the public. In doing so, it effectively acquires these
liberty and property interests-or the negative, reciprocal inter-
est in denying the regulated public the use of these interests-
for itself. Sometimes, as in the context of zoning regulation, this
acquisition is quite plain. For instance, when government enacts
a maximum building-height restriction, it effectively acquires for
itself a negative easement in the airspace estate of the regulated
property owners, denying them the opportunity to build above
the height of the restriction. In other contexts the acquisition is
no less real, though perhaps somewhat less obvious. When gov-
ernment enacts a criminal statute, it withdraws from the
SPRING 2011] 559
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restricted public the liberty interest that those persons previously
enjoyed to undertake the now-proscribed activity, and acquires
for itself a negative liberty interest-as expressed in its new au-
thority to patrol against and punish behavior consistent with the
now-denied liberty interest.
Applying adverse-possession doctrine to government allows a
mechanism by which the public can recapture for itself some of
the liberty and property interests withdrawn by these government
restrictions. The public prescriptive easement doctrine (effec-
tively an aspect of adverse-possession doctrine) already teaches
that the public can, acting in concert, acquire on its behalf
easement rights initially held by other parties. Subjecting gov-
ernment to adverse-possession doctrine generally would
presumptively subject it to public-prescriptive doctrine as well. If,
as suggested above, the doctrine were understood to apply
broadly to all negative easements (or analogous liberty or prop-
erty interests) acquired by government through the regulatory
and statutory processes, it would allow the public to recapture
such property and liberty interests. Abandonment should be
found when government, having enacted restrictions on the en-
joyment of certain liberty and property interests, then
systematically fails to enforce-i.e., constructively abandons-the
restrictions in the face of ongoing, regular, and widespread viola-
tions of which the relevant enforcement authorities are actually
or constructively aware, for the length of the relevant statute-of-
limitations period. Recapture, which is in this process the
obverse of abandonment, should therefore be found when the
public has regularly, broadly, and for the length of the statutory
period, violated the relevant restrictions in a manner that
provides actual or constructive notice to enforcement authorities
of the ongoing and widespread violations. This application of
public-prescriptive doctrine to regulatory and statutory limita-
tions on the interests of the public would track, and effectively
import into the public-regulation context, the waiver doctrine
that has long applied to systematically violated-and-unenforced
restrictions in the private-zoning context (i.e., the context of pri-
vate communities and covenant restrictions). The details of this
proposal, and consideration of its ramifications, appear in
Section III.A. below.
This expansive use of adverse-possession doctrine-especially
with regard to liberty rather than property interests acquired by
government legislation-may initially seem uncomfortably novel.
Such discomfort proves unwarranted. The basic principle animat-
560 [VOL. 44:3
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ing this expanded application of adverse possession is the princi-
ple at the heart of the ancient civil-law doctrine of desuetude, a
doctrine long admired by scholars precisely as a means of retir-
ing long-violated and long-unenforced criminal prohibitions.
Academic supporters of the desuetude doctrine have usually at-
tempted to import it into American law by finding a
constitutional situs for it, but courts have consistently rejected
these efforts on the bases both that desuetude lacks a constitu-
tional foundation and that the doctrine itself proves hopelessly
indeterminate, and so would present a nightmare of application.
Seating desuetude in the adverse-possession doctrine responds to
both of these considerations by providing desuetude an organic
American home in the common law of property rather than in
the Constitution, and by providing it definite, regular, and famil-
iar mechanisms for implementation. The history and theory of
desuetude doctrine, and the potential power of an adverse-
possession-based desuetude, are explored below at Section III.B.
I. ADVERSE POSSESSION AS A PROCESS OF
ABANDONMENT & RECAPTURE
A. Adverse Possession: The Basics
The formal, core elements of adverse possession are well
known. They require that the trespasser's possession of property
be (1) actual; (2) open and notorious to the owner (i.e., actually
known to or reasonably capable of discovery by the owner);
(3) hostile to the owner's interests (i.e., without the owner's
permission); (4) exclusive of the owner's concurrent possession;
and (5) continuous for the length of the statutory period of
limitations on the owner's action to recover possession from the
trespasser.
Courts and legislatures in some states, however, have with
some scholarly support added additional elements to this
core. Chief among these are the requirements that the trespass-
er's possession be made under "claim of right,"5 in "good
4. See STOEBUCK & WHmTMAN, supra note 1, § 11.7, at 853-86; id., § 11.7, at 859 (citing
Alaska Nat'1 Bank v. Linck, 559 P.2d 1049 (Alaska 1977)).
5. The standard interpretation of "claim of right" in the United States for nearly two
centuries has been that the trespasser act toward the property in the same way an owner
would-but, so interpreted, it adds nothing to the core elements of adverse possession. Id.
§ 11.7, at 858 (citing Carpenter v. Coles, 77 N.W. 424 (Minn. 1898)); see, e.g., Roger A. Cun-
ningham, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent: A Reply to Professor Helmholz, 64 WAsH. U.
L.Q. 1, 23 n.75, 59 n.234 (1986). It is, however, too often taken to suggest instead that the
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faith,"6 or with "intent."' Though often confused, these additional
elements-to the extent that they mean anything-do not all mean
the same thing, and are to some extent mutually exclusive.
trespasser's adverse-possession claim will be recognized as valid only if the trespasser acts
with colorable claim of title. See, e.g., STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, Supra note 1, § 11.7, at 855-58;
Merrill, supra note 3, at 1142-44. When thus employed, the element bars adverse possession
completely (or extends the adverse possession period) or adds additional use requirements.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.052(a) (2008) (longer statutory period when adverse posses-
sion occurs without color of title); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-11-106 (2003) (special adverse-
possession period where color of title present); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-11-103 (2003) (longer
period for wild lands when color of title must eventually be presumed); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 38-41-101, -108 (2010) (shorter period if color of title and payment of taxes); FLA. STAT.
§ 95.18 (heightened requirements); TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.024-.025
(Vernon 2002) (longer statutory period when adverse possession occurs without color of
title); see also STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 11.7, at 854 n.7 (listing cases); Barnet,
supra note 2, at 7 (discussing New York's additional requirements where color of title not
demonstrated) (citing N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS LAW § 522 (2009)). Alternatively, this element
can add an obligation that the adverse possessor pay the title owner compensation for her
adverse possession. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 1124 (describing Warsaw v. Chi. Metallic
Ceilings, Inc., 676 P.2d 584 (Cal. 1984), and advocating for similar payments by "bad-faith"
adverse possessors generally); id. at 1126 (describing those trespassers who cannot make
some plausible claim to ownership independent of the eventual adverse-possession claim
itself); see alsoJohn L. McCormack, Title to Property, Title to Marriage: The Social Foundation of
Adverse Possession and Common Law Marriage, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 461, 465 (2008) (arguing that
adverse possession not initiated under color of title "is an anachronism no longer adequate-
lyjustified by any contemporary interest or policy").
6. The "good faith" requirement runs parallel to, yet is broader than, the claim-of-
right/color-of-title requirement. It delays or bars claims by would-be adverse possessors who
know themselves to be trespassing. See, e.g., R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective
Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331 (1983) (arguing that good-faith belief in ownership of the
occupied property plays an important practical role in judicial awards). But see Cunningham,
supra note 5, at 58, passim (contesting Helmholz's claim); Per C. Olson, Comment, Adverse
Possession in Oregon: The Belief-in-Ownership Requirement, 23 ENVTL. L. 1297 (1993) (consider-
ing Oregon's then-recent enactment of stringent good-faith requirements and the practical
effects of such requirements). A colorable claim of right would allow a trespasser to assert
good faith, but so, generally, would unintentional trespass arising from an erroneous but
genuine-even if unexamined-belief that the trespasser owns the relevant property. See,
e.g., Merrill, supra note 3, at 1123. Numerous authors endorse restricting adverse possession
to good-faith trespassers or, even when recognizing the need to employ adverse possession
without reference to good faith, deplore the bad-faith adverse possessor. See, e.g., Richard A.
Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 WASH. U. L.Q 667,
685-89 (1986) (proposing a two-tier statute in which bad-faith claimants would suffer longer
statutory periods before title vests in them); R.H. Helmholz, More on Subjective Intent: A Re-
sponse to Professor Cunningham, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 65, 75 (1986) (arguing that adverse
possession should be restricted to good-faith trespassers); Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans,
An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 162 (1995) (same).
But see Olson, supra, at 1298 ("[A]n inquiry into a claimant's belief in ownership is immate-
rial."). Professor Merrill's conclusion that bad-faith claimants should have to pay
compensation for lands taken by adverse possession is considered infra note 21.
7. Cf STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, sup-a note 1, § 11.7, at 854. The "intent" requirement,
which works to nearly opposite purposes as the good-faith requirement, would limit adverse-
possession claims to trespassers who always intended to possess adversely. The intent re-
quirement is therefore essentially a "bad faith" requirement. In fact, Professor Fennell
argues explicitly that "only the knowing trespasser should be able to prevail in adverse pos-
session." Lee Ann Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for "Bad Faith" Adverse Possession, 100
Nw. U. L. REv. 1037, 1049 (2006). This position is sometimes referred to as the "Maine
Rule." See, e.g., Preble v. Maine R.R. Co., 27 A. 149 (Me. 1893) (establishing the Maine
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Each of these additional elements, if and where adopted, radi-
cally reduces the universe of valid adverse-possession claims. A
trespasser who knows that she has no plausible claim to title of the
land she occupies-except upon adverse possession-would fail
both the color of title and good-faith standards, but would possess
the intent to adversely possess. A second trespasser who makes con-
tinual use of a parcel of land over another claimant-owner's
objections because he believes himself the rightful owner has a
colorable claim of title, assuming that his claim is plausible. He
should also therefore be a good-faith possessor, though perhaps his
assertion of good faith is undermined by his refusal to counte-
nance the competing claim, and to test the claims before the law.
This second trespasser will, though, lack intent to achieve owner-
ship of the property by adverse possession, at least as a primary
matter. A third trespasser, who has no idea that the fence she has
built actually cuts off a corner of her neighbor's property, acts in
good faith both in erecting the fence and in occupying her neigh-
bor's land. She does not, however-as a logical matter, she
cannot-have any real intent at all with regard to possession in the
face of an ownership claim by her neighbor. Nor is she likely to be
acting under color of title; she thinks the land she has enclosed is
hers, but her belief is unexamined and likely unsupported.
As these examples demonstrate, no jurisdiction could coherently
adopt color-of-title, good-faith, and intent requirements; taken to-
gether, these requirements eliminate essentially or absolutely all
potential adverse-possession claims. However, as will be demon-
strated in Section I.C. below, a deeper evaluation of the purpose
and effects of adverse possession reveals that no jurisdiction should
adopt any of them.
Rule); Helmholz, supra note 6, at 339-41. In contrast, under the "Connecticut Rule" the
intent of the trespasser is irrelevant. See French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439 (1831) (establishing
the Connecticut Rule).
8. As the examples above illustrate, ajurisdiction that had adopted all three of these
requirements might theoretically still recognize the adverse-possession claim of a claimant
who occupies with color of title, but with a secondary intention of gaining title by adverse
possession if the color-of-title claim were defeated. The logic of the good-faith requirement
militates against even this narrow exception, however; if a possessor's colorable claim fails,
his residual intent to possess adversely evinces the exact sort of "bad faith" in the face of a
stronger claim to title that the good-faith requirement is designed to exclude. But even if
this narrow and oddly formalistic category of claims were still permitted, the effect would be
effectively to eliminate adverse possession entirely.
SPRING 2011 ] 563
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B. The Traditional justifications ofAdverse Possession
The standard explanation for the doctrine of adverse possession
has significant surface appeal: it reunites ownership and possession
of property in the trespasser after the running of the statute of lim-
itations eliminates the title owner's opportunity to regain
possession by ejectment (or similar) action.' This explanation,
however, proves essentially question begging. By justifying the doc-
trine by reference to the statute of limitations, it simply demands
an explanation of why a statute of limitations applies to actions for
recovery of property by dispossessed owners. One can surely imag-
ine a legal structure in which an owner faces no time constraints
on his opportunities to eject a trespasser to regain possession of
what he continues to hold title to. Yet no jurisdiction has estab-
lished such a rule. 0
The standard moral and philosophical justifications for the uni-
versality of limitations on recovery actions-and thus for adverse
possession-are essentially ad hoc." They include the assertion
(made in defense of statutes of limitations generally) that adverse
possession serves to mitigate the problem of proving stale claims, 2
9. Tim owns five acres of rural land. Sarah occupies that land, perhaps pays taxes,
and generally acts-in accordance with the core elements of adverse possession-as title
owner. Years pass without Tim either noticing Sarah's occupation or acting in response to
it-enough years so that the time during which he may bring action to recover possession
has passed. Now Tim is without recourse and cannot challenge Sarah's continued occupa-
tion and use of land to which he-but for the doctrine of adverse possession-technically
still holds title. Who, though, "owns" the land? Can Sarah sell it? Even if Sarah can sell-as
neither Tim nor anyone else would now have standing to object-who would buy land for
which no title can be produced? If for nothing but administrative ease, then, adverse posses-
sion steps in to grant new title to Sarah and to eliminate the awkwardness inherent in a
division between formal title ownership and permanent possessory rights.
10. Professor Stake has offered model statutory text to achieve just such a resolution.
See Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 CEO. L.J. 2419, 2422-23
(2001).
11. Merrill, supra note 3, at 1127 n.22 ("Casebooks often try to compensate for the lack
of systemic scholarly discussion [of adverse possession] by offering a collection of chestnuts
from various legal sources that suggest different rationales for adverse possession."); see
STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 11.7, at 860 (briefly listingjust such chestnuts).
12. Merrill, supra note 3, at 1128 ("As the quality and quantity of evidentiary material
deteriorates over time, the process of fact-gathering and proof becomes more difficult.... A
rule requiring prompt resolution of claims is thus efficient in that it helps to minimize the
costs of litigation and trial." (citing 21 Jac., c. 16 (1623) (Eng.) (the first English adverse-
possession statute, which declared its purpose to be "quieting of men's estates and avoiding
of suits"))); see Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the
Libertarian Model of Property Rights, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 723, 725-34 (1986) (attempting to es-
tablish a most-efficient range of limitations periods in adverse-possession cases); Klass, supra
note 2, at 289 (another typology); Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession Against the States: The
Hornbooks Have It Wrong, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 939, 941-43 (1996). Not all authors, of
course, find all of these justifications persuasive. See, e.g., Stake, supra note 10, at 2435-55
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that it advances the interest of quieting title to property,'3 that it
serves to punish owners who "sleep on their property rights,",4 and
that it recognizes and accounts for reliance interests developed by
the trespasser and by third parties as a result of the trespasser's
long possession.
Each of these ad hoc justifications, taken alone, proves substan-
tially incomplete. Concerns about the deterioration of evidence
are of course less pressing today than they were four centuries
ago,'6 but even taken at face value the "stale claims" justification
only obliquely explains adverse-possession doctrine. Current pos-
sessors, third parties and courts could all be protected from costly
and inconclusive claims (rendered so by stale evidence) merely by
a presumption of ownership in the long-term possessor, which pre-
sumption could be defeated by clear and substantial proof of title
ownership. No arbitrary time limit need be established. If the own-
er has maintained pristine records, then he will not have created
an evidentiary problem, and his clear, unstale title should, under
this justification, defeat the trespasser's entire lack of title docu-
ments and record ownership whenever she might elect to assert it."
(dividing the justifications for adverse possession into fifteen categories and finding only a
psychological theory of loss aversion persuasive).
13. Merrill, supra note 3, at 1129 ("[I]f th[e] state has no mechanism for eliminating
old claims to property, the information costs, transaction costs, and hold out problems in-
volved in discovering and securing the releases of these claims would very likely impose a
significant impediment to the marketability of property.").
14. Id. at 1130 ("[Tlhe shift in [ownership] acts as a penalty to deter [true owners]
from ignoring their property or othervise engaging in poor custodial practices.").
15. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897) ("A
thing which you have enjoyed and used as your own for a long time, whether property or an
opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be torn away without your resenting the act
and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The law can ask no better justification
than the deepest instincts of man."); Merrill, supra note 3, at 1131-32 ("A fourth . . . expla-
nation ... focuses on the possessor, and in particular on the reliance interests that the
possessor may have developed through longstanding possession of the property.").
16. See, e.g., Bran Gardiner, Squatter's Rights and Adverse Possession: A Searchfor Equitable
Applications of Property Laws, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 119, 125-27 (1997) (reviewing
development of adverse-possession doctrine in Britain).
17. If the would-be adverse possessor claims under color of title, then that claim, along
with whatever evidence may support it, may be tried against the claim and evidence of the
(other) asserted title owner. The passage of time may not have caused equal deterioration in
both claimants' evidence of ownership, but because the claimant in possession could as
easily have brought a quiet-title action during his period of possession as the non-possessing
claimant could bring an action to recover possession, it is difficult to see why the possessing
claimant should unilaterally benefit from a rule (solely) designed to discourage stale claims.
Some additional justification is required to explain that preference. See Holmes, supra note
15, at 476 ("The end of [a statute of limitations] is obvious, but what is the justification for
depriving a man of his rights, a pure evil as far as it goes, in consequence of the lapse of
time? Sometimes the loss of evidence is referred to, but that is a secondary matter. Some-
times the desirability of peace, but why is peace more desirable after twenty years than
before? It is increasingly likely to come without the aid of legislation."); see also Stake, supra
565
566 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 44:3
Similarly, the claim that the statute of limitations on property re-
covery serves to quiet title is both incomplete and somewhat odd.
In the absence of a statute of limitations on property recovery, and
thus of adverse possession, title and ownership would remain quiet-
ly in the record owner, at least so long as the record owner could
prove such title (after which time, again, a narrow rule favoring a
possessor in the absence of any competent evidence of title owner-
ship would suffice). The statute of limitations and the resulting
adverse-possession doctrine itself disquiets title-and is systemically
unlikely to result in easily discoverable, reliably recorded title."
The reliance justification is also significantly incomplete. This
justification springs from a variety of sources, including the per-
sonhood theory of property, concerns about violence that might
erupt upon recommitment of property to the title owner, and the
loss to the trespassing possessor of costs sunk into the use and de-
velopment of the property trespassed upon." These concerns,
however, do not explain why the law should favor the reliance in-
terests and potential losses of the trespasser over the (presumably
usually much larger) reliance interests and potential losses of the
note 10, at 2439, 2455 (noting that the indeterminacy of adverse-possession elements, and
thus of potential adverse-possession determinations, create their own problems of potential-
ly stale evidence and costly trial, while the adverse-possession rule bars some true owners
with good title from recovery).
18. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 12, at 730 (noting that while adverse possession will
sometimes lower search costs, it "bestows valid claims upon persons not identified in the
land records," thus disquieting title and raising potential title-search costs). Professor Merrill
explains and supports the quiet-title justification of adverse possession by noting that but for
statutes of limitations on property-recovery claims,
[t]itle examiners would have to trace every deed back to its source; ancient ease-
ments, unextinguished spousal rights, grants of future interests, unreleased
mortgages or liens could well be discovered; these interests would have to be traced
to present-day successors; and releases of these interests would have to be secured....
The 'nuisance' value of these claims could easily lead to holding out or other rent-
seeking behavior that would make the process of obtaining clear title even more bur-
densome.
Merrill, supra note 3, at 1129. This is arguably true for properties held in the normal course
of transfer (though it should be noted that the investigation and quieting should only have
to be done once). But it does nothing to explain why statutes of limitations should work on
behalf of the titleless adverse possessor, whether possessing in good faith or bad. Without
additional justification, it remains unclear why it would be valuable to create a new and
potentially unrecorded and untested title chain, following a period of legal indeterminacy,
for a trespasser. Perhaps, then, this justification, standing alone, would provide support for
(only) the "strong" color-of-title theory of adverse possession.
19. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 3, at 1131-32; MargaretJane Radin, Time, Possession,
and Alienation, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 741-42, 745 (1986) (discussing the personhood theory
of property).
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title owner.20 Nor does it explain why adverse possession results in a
transfer of the title to the property, rather than a requirement that
the title owner compensate the trespasser for some or all of the
value added to the property by the trespasser's improvements.
With regard to third-party reliance interests, meanwhile, it is not
clear why these concerns would result in a transfer of ownership of
the property to the trespasser, rather than simple satisfaction of any
bona fide obligations running from the trespasser to third parties
out of the ownership interest that nevertheless always remained in
the title owner.
Professor Stake has argued that the reliance justification is
properly based in the "endowment effect," the apparent psycholog-
ical fact that "the loss of an asset has more impact on utility than
does the gain of the same asset. Moreover, "people become more
attached to tangible physical assets than to financial assets and feel
a greater sense of loss when deprived of tangible physical objects."2
As a result, he argues, if both the adverse possessor and the record
owner claim a property, then the possessor would feel the transfer
of the property back to the record owner more keenly than would
the record owner feel the reverse transfer. Internal difficulties
with this explanation arise. The data do not seem to address, for
instance, the question of whether a claimant's total-loss calculation
will be affected by the amount of the claimant's investment in the
property prior to the loss. If that variable matters even a small
amount, then Stake's conclusion that the data support transfer in
good-faith situations proves problematic.
20. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 1131-32.
21. Professor Merrill advocated nearly the reverse of this system-compensation from
the trespasser to the title owner in cases of bad-faith adverse possession. See id. at 1146. As he
recognized, however, his suggestion is nowhere in the statutory law, and seldom evinces
itself in decisions. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L.
REv. 1, 70 (2002) (advocating a similar model, with adverse possession governed by a "plia-
bility" rule: a property right in the true owner followed by a "call option" in the adverse
possessor, before complete adverse possession would occur); see also Susan Lorde Martin,
Adverse Possession: Practical Realities and an Unjust Enrichment Standard, 37 REAL EsT. L.J. 133
(2008) (endorsing a requirement that adverse possessors who would be "unjustly enriched"
by their efforts be obliged to pay original owners for the property).
22. Stake, supra note 10, at 2460.
23. Id. at 2463.
24. See id. at 2454.
25. See id. at 2471 ("[T] he ... experiments support adverse possession only when AP is
acting in good faith."). If there is a sunk-investment effect like the one I suggested above,
however, then the record owner is often likely to have a much greater endowment-effect
claim to the property, because of the generally much greater investment in the contested
property than has the adverse possessor. The endowment effect would then seem only to
support strong color-of-title cases as well, and even then only such cases in which the adverse
possessor has some reasonable basis for believing her claim to be backed not just by title, but
by previous investment in the property.
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Like the other justifications considered above, moreover, Stake's
model lacks a central component: an explanation of why the title-
less trespasser's interests and welfare should be thought
competitive with, much less eventually able to trump, the title own-
er's. The fourth justification provides this explanation: the fact that
the title owner has "slept on his rights" for such a long period that
it is appropriate to penalize him by taking away his property inter-
est. To do the work required of it, though, this explanation must
26
be fleshed out beyond the standard recitation. When an owner
sleeps on his rights, what he really does is fail to evict the trespass-
er-whether because he has failed to notice her, or is aware of her
presence but has not bothered to chase her away. This behavior
can be thought problematic-it can be the basis for a penalty-
only if the owner has some affirmative obligation to notice and
evict. Whence does that obligation arise? Scholars seem not to have
given too much direct consideration to this question, but an ex-
planation is readily available. Property interests arise, relevantly,
when the supply of a good is limited and the good itself is desirable
in greater quantities than are available for free acquisition (i.e., the
good is scarce) . With regard to such property, then, the re-
quirement that an owner not sleep on his rights must arise from a
conclusion that justice does not permit an owner of goods both to
remove the scarce good from potential ownership and use by other
desiring parties and also completely to abandon any functional in-
terest in the good itself, neither using it nor preserving it for future
26. See, e.g., id. at 2434-35 (dismissing standard recitation).
27. See, e.g., Joshua Getzler, Theories of Property and Economic Development, 26 J. INTER-
DISC. HIST. 639, 639 (1996) ("Economic reasoning suggests that markets themselves call
property rights into existence: Persons contract to set up institutions enforcing stable, defi-
nite entitlements to scarce resources ... ."). Certainly land, which provides the archetypal
case for the application of adverse possession, is substantially, though not entirely, inelastic.
Human initiative can increase marginally the absolute supply of usable landmass; consider
the dykes of Holland or the reclamation of the swamps of the Meadowlands. See generally
ROBERTJ. HOEKSMA, DESIGNED FOR DRY FEET: FLOOD PROTECTION AND LAND RECLAMATION
IN THE NETHERLANDS (2006) (discussing the dykes of Holland); Robert M. Hordon, Mead-
owlands, Hackensack, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW JERSEY 506-07 (Maxine N. Lurie & Marc
Mapen eds., 2004). These endeavors, though, are both extremely costly and ultimately lim-
ited. Similarly, some of the functional value of some plots of land can be multiplied by, for
example, erection of multiple-storey buildings, or the development of technologies that
increase agricultural output per acre. (These processes could also be reversed, however, as
will result if global warming recurs and results in heightened sea levels.)
28. In principle, all of the claims made in this Article should apply to personal proper-
ty as well as real. But see Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BuFF.
L. REv. 119 passim (1989) (arguing that "the most important element required to establish
adverse possession of personal property is the good faith and reasonable reliance of the
adverse possessor"). Space limitations, however, require constraining the primary focus of




use nor even monitoring it sufficiently to know whether or not it is
being put to any use or misuse by any other parties.
The "sleeping on one's rights" justification is also not itself com-
plete. While it does provide the necessary explanation for why a
title owner can ever be deprived of ownership while his title re-
mains clear and is not challenged by any other colorable-title
claimant, it by itself can provide no explanation for why a trespasser
on the property should be the beneficiary when the pervasive dere-
liction of the title owner justifies withdrawing the benefits of title
ownership. This gap, though, is filled in part by the other justifica-
tions, particularly those of reliance and quieting title.
C. Abandonment & Recapture: A Comprehensive
Theory of Adverse Possession
From the four ad hoc justifications just considered can be dis-
tilled a more complete account of what adverse possession is, why it
matters, and how it should be delimited. A property interest is a
right to control, direct, and defend a scarce resource, as against
others desirous of obtaining the same interest in the same good.
The adverse-possession doctrine arises from the recognition that
an ownership interest carries with it the nearly (but not complete-
ly) de minimis obligation to (1) put the good to some use; and/or
(2) protect the good from use by others, either in the pursuit of
conservation goals or to preserve the good for the owner's own fu-
ture use. This minimal obligation carries with it by definition the
obligation to pay enough attention to the property owned to know
whether it has been taken or invaded continuously over a long pe-
riod of time (i.e., over the statute-of-limitations period). An owner
who fails of this minimal obligation has lost the right to expect
vindication of his property interests at law. It may be said that this
derelict owner has constructively abandoned the property.
In the normal course, this constructive abandonment would go
unnoticed. While the owner fails to use or conserve or monitor
his property, he doubtless does not overtly advertize his delin-
quency either. Thus the constructively abandoned property would
go un-reclaimed for use by other desirous potential owners, but
for the actions of the trespasser. The trespasser's invasion estab-
lishes the potential for constructive abandonment, and her
29. See, e.g., Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERs L. REV. 357, 374
(1954) ("[T]hat is property to which the following label can be attached: To the world: Keep
off unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold. Signed: Private citizen.
Endorsed: The state.")
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continuing occupation for the statutory period proves the default.
Her behavior, then, serves a positive social good: identifying scarce
resources to which the title holder has lost his claim, and bringing
those resources back into circulation. Moreover, the trespasser un-
dertakes this socially valuable action (though one no doubt
motivated by personal interests, if intentional) at significant per-
sonal hazard. This hazard includes potential loss of improvements
made to the property and/or even criminal punishment should
the title owner notice and terminate her trespass prior to the stat-
ute's running, thus demonstrating that he had not constructively
abandoned the property. Under these circumstances, it comports
with justice, efficiency, and the common law of finds to award the
property to the intrepid trespasser who demonstrated the construc-
tive abandonment and who, in effect, reclaimed the abandoned
property.30 Once that award has been made, meanwhile, it makes
every sense formally to issue new title to the property to the new
owner, thus quieting title, obliterating the claims arising from the
now-abandoned-and-extinguished title chain, and ratifying any jus-
tifiable third-party reliance stemming from the adverse possessor's
long occupation or control of the relevant property.
Consider too the abandoning owner. In this explication of ad-
verse possession, the losing owner can be deprived only in two
circumstances: wherein the owner had no idea, for a significant
period, that his property had been invaded, or wherein the owner
knew that the property had been invaded, but failed despite that
knowledge to take action for the same period of time. Sometimes,
of course, this failure of knowledge or action is excusable, and the
doctrine includes tolling provisions to account for such circum-
stances. It is hard to pity an owner who loses title to his property
after he has for years known of another's continuing trespass and
who has left the property to that trespasser without suit, complaint,
or "blessing" of the trespass sufficient to rob it of its hostile charac-
ter. In fact, it is most congruous to view this not only as constructive
but as tacit abandonment. (The case would be different were the
trespasser securing the owner's inaction by duress, but such intim-
30. See, e.g., Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("The
common law of finds treats property that is abandoned as returned to the state of nature
and thus equivalent to property, such as fish or ocean plants, with no prior owners. The first
person to reduce such property to 'possession,' either actual or constructive, becomes its
owner." (citing R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 15 (2d ed. 1955))).
31. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. 83/9 (1934); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-14-21 (West 2000);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.16.080, 4.16.090 (West 1989); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, Supra
note 1, § 11.7, at 853-84 (tolling provisions "for owners who are insane, infants, imprisoned,
absent from the state, or in military service when the cause of action first accrues").
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idatory tactics would toll the limitations period as well.) Tacit
abandonment also fits the owner whose monitoring of his property
is so slight that he fails to discover open and notorious occupation
or possession of the property by the would-be trespasser over the
statutory period. This leaves only the instance in which the owner
could not, even with reasonable diligence, have monitored his lands
sufficiently to identify and respond to trespassers within the statu-
tory period. (Absentee owners of vast tracts of forest land during
the colonial and early-Republic periods in the United States pro-
vide a useful example. 3 ) An owner who lacks resources even to
undertake occasional and minimal monitoring of his property will
lack too the resources to make present use of that property, and
the present-resource mismatch bespeaks the unlikelihood of the
owner being able to make use of large portions of the property at
any time in the reasonable future. Perhaps it is a necessary corol-
lary of the adverse-possession doctrine that an individual or entity's
permissible property holdings are capped, at the margin, at the
quantity that the individual or entity can monitor effectively so as
to avoid adverse-possession deprivations. Given that the owner
could, during the pendency of the statutory period, sell some of
the possessions he is incapable of monitoring to other owners
more equipped (perhaps because less burdened with other proper-
ty holdings of their own) in order to raise resources enough to
allow him to monitor the rest, such a marginal property-ownership
cap hardly seems excessively onerous.
Interesting corollaries and consequences follow from this expli-
cation of adverse possession. First, it becomes clear that none of
the additional doctrinal restrictions considered above-the good-
faith requirement, the intent requirement, or the color-of-title
requirement-should apply.3 4 As seen above, the successful adverse
possessor performs a significant social good at significant personal
risk, without regard to whether she initially acted in good faith or
bad, and with or without specific intent or color of title. The "bad-
faith" trespasser who acts without color of tide, in fact, acts at sig-
nificantly greater risk, because without serious defense against
charges of criminal trespass. She should not find her reward
uniquely tenuous at her moment of achievement. Nor would the
32. Cf. 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned, Lost, and Unclaimed Property § 8 (2005) (noting that
"abandonment must not be under threat, coercion, pressure or misapprehension, of any
kind" (citing Katsaris v. United States, 684 F.2d 758 (11th Cir. 1982))).
33. See, e.g., Paul W. Gates, Tenants of the Log Cabin, 49 Miss. VALLEY HIsT. R. 3, 5-6
(1962); John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L.
REV. 816, 842-44 & nn.118 & 122 (1994).
34. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text.
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abandoning title owner have any special claims not to have aban-
doned the property as a result of the trespasser's bad faith or initial
intent.
Second, it should be clear from this explication that the adverse-
possession doctrine need pose no threat to modem environmental
efforts." As suggested above, the minimal ownership obligation
that undergirds the doctrine is not really one of productive use-at
least insofar as that term is taken to mean something like the op-
posite of environmental conservation-but merely one of minimal
monitoring and legal control. There is no reason that preservation
of land in its evolving natural state, or for some particular envi-
ronmental purpose (as, say, a wildlife refuge), would not be
considered a "use" of the land sufficient-if genuinely undertak-
en-to belay any concerns about abandonment.7 No less than
extractive uses, however, conservational uses require some non-
trivial level of monitoring and oversight to be effective.m Property
35. It follows that the abandonment-and-recapture theory of adverse possession would
reject models like Professor Merrill's, which distinguish between good-faith and bad-faith
possessors. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. The theory would permit the introduc-
tion of liability rules into the adverse-possession process, but only if applied equally to all
adverse possessors and only if the liability-rule stage (i.e., the stage at which the adverse
possessor could retain possession, but would have to pay compensation to the record owner)
preceded a complete-interest-transfer stage such as now characterizes adverse possession.
36. Professor Sprankling raised the concern that the adverse-possession "doctrine is
... dominated by a prodevelopment nineteenth century ideology that encourages and
legitimates economic exploitation-and thus environmental degradation-of wild lands.
This 'development model' is fundamentally antagonistic to the twentieth century concern
for preservation." Sprankling, supra note 33, at 816, 840-53; see Latovick, supra note 12, at
944-45; Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession of Municipal Land: It's Time to Protect This
Valuable Asset, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 475, 490-91 (1998) (decrying adverse possession
as exhibiting a pro-development bias); see also Barnet, supra note 2, at 22 (same); Klass,
supra note 2, passim (same); cf Latovick, supra note 12, at 941 (decrying adverse
possession as exhibiting a pro-development bias). Sprankling argued that conservationism
and wilderness preservation should be considered uses of property, and in fact that lands
putatively assigned to such uses should be immune from adverse possession. See
Sprankling, supra note 33, at 862-67. The relationship between Sprankling's proposals
and the implications of the abandonment-and-recapture model of adverse possession
embraced in this Article is developed in the immediately subsequent footnotes.
37. This recognition comports with Sprankling's concerns that maintenance of prop-
erty in wild or conservational form be recognized as an effective use of that property, and his
recognition that "[t]he traditional distinction between productive and recreational [or con-
servational] activity in the exclusivity context serves no purpose." See Sprankling, supra note
33, at 866; see also Klass, supra note 2, at 286 ("This shift would result in courts focusing, for
the first time, on evidence that the owner intended to leave the land in a natural state, or
that the owner's actions resulted in a conservation benefit ... .).
38. For an excellent note addressing these monitoring obligations, see Walter Quentin
Impert, Note, Whose Land is it Anyway?: It's Time to Reconsider Sovereign Immunity from Adverse
Possession, 49 UCLA L. REv. 447, 455-58 (2001). In his note, Impert recognized the key
distinction between disuse and meaningful stewardship, noting that "use of land for an envi-
ronmental purpose requires effort and vigilance. Land will only serve an environmentally
beneficial purpose if it is not only designated for such use, but regularly monitored as well."
SPRING 2011] Abandonment & Recapture
purportedly preserved as natural wilderness but so badly moni-
tored that its owners have allowed trespassers to invade and occupy
it for a course of years really has been effectively abandoned, and
the purported conservational use entirely defeated, just as surely as
would be purported farm land on which trespassers had entered
and established a car dealership. 9 Conversely, trespassing conserva-
tionists who dismantle the remnants of a disused farm operation to
return the land to something approaching its pristine condition,
and then monitor that property against further invasion to main-
tain it as a protected wilderness, have used that property. They
(assuming their satisfaction of the core elements of adverse posses-
sion over the statutory period) have thus earned title to the
property just as would more "productive" users.' In between these
Id. at 456. This is the appropriate response to Sprankling's proposal that modern conserva-
tional considerations be taken into account by "exempti[ng] privately-owned wild lands
from adverse possession" entirely because the conservation-minded owner "is unlikely to visit
the land because visitation is inconsistent with his preservation goal." Sprankling, supra note
33, at 827, 863. In support of his proposal, for instance, Sprankling asserted that "an adverse
possessor's one acre corn field may provide ample notice to the resident owner of a 1000
acre farm. In contrast, an adverse possessor's activities on a one acre clearing are very un-
likely to afford notice to the absentee owner of 1000 acres of forest." Id. at 827. This observa-
observation is correct if the latter owner is entirely absentee. If such is the case, however, then
the owner has effectively abandoned his property; he makes no effort whatever to preserve
its wild nature, thus placing that wild nature at risk. Whether the trespasser who occupies
the one-acre clearing will have earned adverse possession of the property will depend on
whether the occupation and use meets the elements of adverse possession considered above,
but if the possession is sufficient to have destroyed the wild character of the property within
that one-acre clearing, then the original owner's conservational claims with regard to that
clearing, at any rate, have been demonstrably pretextual. There is no reason such pretext
should be rewarded by special protection from adverse possession. Sprankling worried that
"[tlotal preservation of wild lands by private owners may therefore be impossible under
existing law," because avoiding adverse possession requires some level of monitoring. Id. at
862. In fact, "total preservation of wild lands," if defined as preservation without any obliga-
tion to monitor, is impossible under any regime in which humans are present; if there is no
monitoring to maintain the conservational nature of the property, then trespass and inva-
sion cannot be precluded. Meanwhile, Klass has demonstrated that conservancy
organizations have successfully monitored lands maintained in wild conditions, generally
organized under conservation easements, and thus have successfully protected them from
adverse possession. See Klass, supra note 2, at 306-09. Note, however, that Klass' preferred
solution differs from the one embraced here; she would render a record-owner's conserva-
tion intent alone sufficient to thwart adverse possession by cultivation or development, even
if demonstrated by nothing more than a declaration of that intent. See id. at 323-25. For the
reasons just articulated, however, mere recordation of conservation claims is insufficient.
39. See, e.g., Carl C. Risch, Encouraging the Responsible Use of Land By Municipalities: The
Erosion of Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi and the Use of Adverse Possession Against Municipal
Land Owners, 99 DICK. L. REv. 197, 215-16 (1994) (making similar arguments in the context
of adverse possession of property held by government purportedly for environmental pur-
poses).
40. Some states have already specifically recognized this opportunity for adverse posses-
sion by conservation. In Vezey v. Green, 35 P.3d 14, 25 n.39 (Alaska 2001), the Alaska Supreme
Court awarded possession based in part on the adverse possessor's "conservation-oriented uses
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two extremes, the determination of whether a trespass merits
treatment as an adverse possession will depend on the manner and
scope of the trespass and the nature of the claimed conservational
use. If the trespass is too slight to undermine the basic character of
the conservational use, it should not qualify as exclusive. If it is so
pervasive that it does undermine the claims of preservational use,
however, then this would demonstrate that the owner's monitoring
efforts had been too meager (or non-existent) to maintain the
purported use of the property. In such circumstances, if the tres-
passer has met the other elements of adverse possession, the
abandoning owner should not be heard to complain.
Given how neatly this theory of abandonment and recapture ac-
counts for the full, standard exposition of adverse possession, and
of the property, which included planting indigenous rather than non-native plants and
thinning trees and undergrowth rather than clearing them entirely." These actions "have
the same legal weight as would more transformative or destructive uses: They are significant
to the extent that they did, or should have, alerted the record owner to the adverse posses-
sion." Id.; see also Fife v. Andersen-Nielsen, No. A03-1990, 2004 WL 2094541 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 21, 2004) (finding that affirmative acts to maintain natural state of woods qualified as
"use" for adverse-possession purposes).
41. Sprankling wondered, "What justifies these results?" Sprankling, supra note 33, at
816.
A, the owner of 260 acres of wild forest land, loses title to a claimant who hunts on
the land and sometimes cuts a few trees. B, the owner of a large gravel bar, loses title
to a claimant who occasionally fishes on the land and removes sand and gravel. C, the
owner of sixty-three acres of unfenced natural grassland, loses title to claimants who
sometimes graze sheep and cattle on the property.
Id. (citing Kroulik v. Knuppel, 634 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Colo. App. 1981); Quarles v. Arcega, 841
P.2d 550, 561 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992); Goff v. Shultis, 257 N.E.2d 882, 885 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1970)). Sprankling concluded that they were justified only by the lingering pro-development
bias in the law of adverse possession, and were unjustified in the modem context. Id. The
abandonment-and-recapture model advanced here provides a different potential answer. If
the original owners really had abandoned the property, or if their monitoring of their
claimed conserving uses were so cursory as to render the claims pretextual, then the courts'
recognitions of adverse possession in these instances may have been justified on those
grounds. If, on the other hand, the potentially adverse-possessing uses were fleeting, mini-
mal, or sporadic in ways that did not undermine the intended uses of the property by the
owner and thus would not have been caught by monitoring sufficient to preserve those uses,
then the adverse-possession awards in these cases were inappropriate under the abandon-
ment-and-recapture model as well.
Additionally, Sprankling suggested that continued payment of taxes by a non-using owner
should be treated as definitive proof that the owner intends a conservational use, thus pre-
termitting adverse-possession claims. Id. at 876. Payment of taxes should of course provide
some evidence of non-abandonment in the conservation-lands context, just as it does in any
other land context. Mere payment of taxes, however, will do nothing to preserve the lands in
actual preservational forms, and thus should not obviate the owner's obligation to monitor
to ensure continuing conservational status. Moreover, a failure of anyone to pay taxes results
in escheat to the state, not in transfer to the adverse possessor, and as has been discussed
supra note 30 and accompanying text, the successful adverse possessor, whether of produc-
tive or preserved property, affirmatively merits award of the property adversely possessed.
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how incompletely other explanations fill that role, it is surprising
that it has not been posited before. An explanation may lie in the
fact that it has been an axiom of the common law that "land can-
not be abandoned," and that, even if it could, abandonment re-
requires intent.43 There seldom follows, however, any explanation
of why land cannot be abandoned, nor abandonment be construc-
tive. It appears that the only justification for the non-abandonment
axiom arises from long-defunct feudal considerations. 44 Owners
have certainly effectively abandoned real property regularly in Amer-
ican history, a fact perhaps most dramatically observed in the
skeletal remains of resource-rush centers turned into ghost towns.
Formally recognizing such abandonment would, as suggested
above, do no more than return the property abandoned to the legal
state of nature, surely no stranger to American law either. As for the
intent requirement, American law regularly employs the legal fiction
of constructive intent, which arises when "an act leading to the result
could have been reasonably expected to cause that result."4 6 Such
constructive intent allows the law to, for instance, impute construc-
tive contracts "created by law for the sake ofjustice" rather than as a
42. See, e.g., Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 225 (D.R.I.
2002) (asserting, without explanation or support, that "[hland cannot be abandoned");
Picken v. Richardson, 77 A.2d 191, 194 (Me. 1950) (noting that "a perfect legal title cannot
be lost by abandonment"); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned, Lost and Unclaimed Property § 5 (2005)
(stating that "title to real estate is not lost by abandonment unless abandonment is accom-
panied by circumstances of estoppel and limitation" (citing Maroney v. City of Malvern, 899
S.W.2d 476 (Ark. 1995))); see also James C. Roberton, Recent Development-Abandonment of
Mineral Rights, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1227 (1969) (confirming the rule and discussing its origins
and purposes).
43. Bruner v. Geneva Cnty. Forestry Dept., 865 So.2d 1167, 1172 (Ala. 2003) (quoting
Johnson v. Northpointe Apartments, 744 So.2d 899 (Ala. 1999)); Griffis v. Davidson Cnty.
Metro. Gov't, 164 S.W.3d 267, 278-79 (Tenn. 2005); 1 AM. JUR. 2D Abandoned, Lost and Un-
claimed Property § 9 (2005) (citing Kitchen v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 260 S.E.2d
772 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)).
44. See Roberton, supra note 42, at 1228 n.13 ("[The only function of the policy against
abandonment] was to protect a certain political relationship of the feudal system that is no
longer in existence. The services, or incidents, that a tenant was required to perform for his
lord were not personal obligations, but obligations that ran with the land. The rule against
abandonment ... was designed to protect the lord by ensuring that he would always have a
tenant to whom he could look for performance of the incidents." (internal citations omit-
ted)).
45. See, e.g., DENNIS DRABELLE, MILE HIGH FEVER: SILVER MINES, BOOM TOWNS AND
HIGH LIVING ON THE COMSTOCK LODE (2009); see also Gregory M. Duhl, Property and Custom:
Allocating Space in Public Places, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 199, 241 (2006) (noting mass abandonment
of privately owned buildings in New York City in the 1970s and 1980s.).
46. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 881 (9th ed. 2009); see also Dirks v. Union Savings Ass'n,
168 N.W. 578, 579 (S.D. 1918) (stating that the law imputes constructive intent to defraud
creditors from an act of giving a gift when knowingly insolvent).
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result of parties' intent.47 The case is the same with regard to ad-
verse possession; the law constructively imputes abandonment
when the record owner's behavior over a long period shows a
complete disregard for scarce property consistent with a conclu-
sion of abandonment, and the imputation avoids the dual
injustices of allowing the record owner's disregard to remove the
scarce resource permanently from the available property pool and
of failing to reward the intrepid trespasser who has identified the
disregard and has returned the property to the pool, whether for
productive or conservational uses.
A presumption of non-abandonment, and a refusal ever to im-
pute abandonment, makes sense in the context of vessels and
cargoes lost at sea, where duress can confidently be expected to
explain and justify an owner's leaving her property behind.
Abandonment of immobile real property on dry land presents a
wholly different profile, and justifies the reverse presumption after
a long period of total neglect, particularly in light of the generous
tolling provisions recognized above."
Any lingering concerns about the advisability of introducing a
concept of constructive abandonment of real property as a prong
of and partial justification for adverse possession might be allayed
by assurances that constructive abandonment will have no power
outside of the adverse-possession context, where, after all, the con-
cept serves not to increase functional abandonment, but rather to
thwart it. Such would at all events be the practical result of the
abandonment-and-recapture theory, even without a formal declara-
tion, as nothing but continuing trespass and possession would have
the power to demonstrate the complete neglect necessary to justify
a declaration of constructive abandonment.
II. BURYING NULLUM TEMPUS OCCURRT REGI
Another old chestnut thought to define and delimit adverse-
possession doctrine, oft recited but too seldom examined, holds
that one may not adversely possess against the government. The
justification for this rule is given in the Latin, nullum tempus occurrit
47. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 370 (9th ed. 2009); see, e.g., Cnty. Comm'r of Caroline
Cnty. v.J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 747 A.2d 600, 606 (Md. 2000).
48. See, e.g., Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 355-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
49. See sources cited supra note 31 (noting various tolling provisions included in the
doctrine of adverse possession).
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regi, meaning "time does not run against the king."'o The tenacity
of this hoary old Latin tag in the adverse-possession context is diffi-
cult to justify, given its general obsolescence and invalidity.
Whatever the cause of its survival, however, the time has come to
abandon the maxim and to render government (or for govern-
ment to render itself) amenable to adverse possession-not just in
its formal property holdings, but in its acts and regulations that
impinge upon citizens' property and liberty interests.5' The notion
that nullum tempus actually preserves, in practice, "public rights,
revenues and property from injury and loss" turns out to be false in
important ways. In fact, as will be discussed below, the maxim pro-
tects inefficient or malign officials and incongruous public policies
and programs from the bracing and clarifying effects that adverse-
possession doctrine provides. Likewise, the notion that government
land holding is, either theoretically or practically, different from
non-government landholding in ways that justify specially exempt-
ing government from adverse-possession doctrine is also wrong.
A. An Unjustifiable Remnant of an Abandoned Theory of Governance
Nullum tempus arose and proceeds as a "vestigial survival of the
prerogative of the Crown."" It has been justified in this country not
on those grounds, but on grounds of public policy. "The true rea-
son,"Justice Story explained in 1821, "the law has determined, that
there can be no negligence or laches imputed to the crown, and,
therefore, no delay should bar its right [is] the great public policy
of preserving the public rights, revenues, and property from injury
and loss, by the negligence of public officers."" This public-policy
argument, though, has grown stale, and was largely abandoned in
the twentieth century. Time (in the form of statutes of limitations)
runs against the king's more constrained successor, the modern
liberal state, regularly. Some statutes of limitations, such as those
that bar tardy criminal prosecution of most offenses, run only
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (6th ed. 1990). In the American context, it some-
times goes by the alias of nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae. See, e.g., Evans v. Erie Cnty., 66 Pa.
222 (1870); Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1251
(1950). The most recent addition of BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, in fact, includes an entry for
the reipublicaeform but not for the traditional regi form. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1173 (9th
ed. 2009).
51. See generally infra Section I (discussing public adverse possession of property and
liberty interests taken by government restriction).
52. Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938) (citations omitted).
53. United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330 (C.C. Mass. 1821).
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against government."4 Nullum tempus' first cousin, the sovereign-
immunity doctrine, 5  has likewise been surrendered by modem
governments in the context of contract and tort suits, 5 6 and even
with regard to suits contesting title to land.5 ' At the state and mu-
nicipal level, the absolute bar against adverse possession against
the government has itself begun to wear away, even if only tenta-
tively.58 These withdrawals from the notion that the government
might never be charged with its errors or neglect, or those of its
officers, progressed-often expressly"9-in recognition of the fact
that nullum tempus arose in aid of a bygone theory of government,
60
one contrary to modern usages.
The remaining vestige of nullum tempus, the one that hangs on
to justify excluding government from the adverse-possession doc-
54. See Developments in the Law, supra note 50, at 1252.
55. See, e.g., Sigmund D. Schutz, Time to Reconsider Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi-The
Applicability of Statutes of Limitations Against the State of Maine in Civil Actions, 55 ME. L. REV.
373, 382-84 (2003) (reviewing the shared historic roots of nullum tempus and sovereign im-
munity).
56. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 933 (1948) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006)) (providing for U.S. government waiver of sovereign immunity in
tort suits); Tucker Act, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (providing for U.S. government waiver of
sovereign immunity in contract suits).
57. Quiet Tide Act, Pub. L. No. 92-562, 86 Stat. 1176 (1972) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(f), 1402(d), 2409a) (providing for U.S. government waiver of sovereign immunity
in land-title disputes).
58. Professor Latovick catalogued various state approaches to adverse possession, and
their deviations from strict application of nullum tempus, in Latovick, supra note 12, at 945-
78. See also Risch, supra note 39. Latovick ultimately advised states against allowing adverse
possession of state property. Her support for this position, along with that of other oppo-
nents of retiring nullum tempus in the adverse-possession context, are considered infra notes
61-72, 102-03 and accompanying text. This Article does not, except incidentally, consider
the contours of individual states' exceptions to the nullum tempus bar to adverse possession
against government; instead it argues that the bar should be lifted entirely.
59. Senator Frank Church, who introduced the original version of the Quiet Tide Act,
explained the incongruity of sovereign immunity in a polity "where the courts are estab-
lished, not for the convenience of the sovereign, but to serve the people." 117 CONG. REc.
549 (1971), quoted in Carlton Wayne Washington, Block v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Board of
University and School Lands: A Restrictive Interpretation of the Quiet Title Act, 33 CATH. U. L.
REv. 773, 784 (1984); see also Shootman v. Dep't of Transp. 926 P.2d 1200, 1206 (Colo.
1996) ("Having abrogated sovereign immunity [in Evans v. County of El Paso, 482 P.2d 968
(Colo. 1971)], and having recognized that nullum tempus is simply an aspect of sovereign
immunity, we have supplied the reasoning that leads directly to our conclusion today that
the doctrine of nullum tempus no longer applies to the State."); Evans v. Cnty. of El Paso, 482
P.2d 968, 969-70 (Colo. 1971) (summarizing state-court cases overturning sovereign im-
munity, concluding that "[t]he monarchical philosophies invented to solve the marital
problems of Henry VIII are not sufficient justification for the denial of the right of recovery
against the government in today's society"), superseded by statute.
60. See, e.g., Devins v. Borough of Bogota, 592 A.2d 199, 202 (N.J. 1991) ("A second
reason [for nullum tempus] was that the king established his own rules for litigation." (citing
Note, State's Immunity to the Statute of Limitations, 38 ILL. L. REV. 418, 419 (1944))); Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 50, at 1252-53.
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trine, runs thus: governments are big and complicated; they own
much land; their employees are not always earnest and diligent;
and should the structure of government or the quality of its em-
ployees result in inattention to government property over the
statutory period, "the public (for whom the government holds the
land) should not suffer from the negligence or inattention of gov-
ernment agents."
In a world in which nullum tempus has otherwise broadly been
abandoned, however, this assertion makes little sense. Why should
the public enjoy special protection against the effects of incompe-
tent or venal employees in the context of preserving public lands,
but not in the seemingly much more serious context of criminal
prosecution?62 A failure in the former context costs government
(and the people) nothing more than money. Were government to
lose some item of property to adverse possession, it could of course
repurchase the property, even over the adverse possessor's objec-
tions, using the eminent-domain power. A similar failure in the
criminal-prosecution context, however, costs the public the threat
of an untried and potentially guilty and dangerous criminal min-
gling among them unchastened. Abandonment of nullum tempus
would seem much less problematic in the adverse-possession than
in the criminal-prosecution context. And given that the public's
acquiescence in government employment of the incompetent, the
inefficient, or the venal will always, more or less by definition, cost
the public both wasted tax money and inferior public service, it is
difficult to see how the losses occasioned by application of adverse
possession to government would be in any way unique.
In fact, the public should demand application of adverse posses-
sion to its government servants in part as an early-warning system
of government failure and as a means of inhibiting wasteful gov-
ernment capture and disuse of property that could be put to more
efficient use or more effective conservation in private hands. As
noted above, all laxity or misfeasance by government servants will
harm the public good. Much of it, however, proves difficult for the
61. Latovick, supra note 12, at 943-44; see also Latovick, supra note 36, at 488-89; Devel-
opments in the Law, supra note 61, at 1251-52 (stating common objection); Andrew T. Fede,
The Clock is Ticking: Why the Courts or the Legislature Should Prohibit Adverse Possession and Ease-
ment by Prescription Claims in Municipal Land, N.J. LAw. MAG., Oct. 2007, at 61
("[G]overnmental inaction coupled with the mere passage of time should not cause a trans-
fer of ownership or other rights in public lands to third parties without the payment of just
compensation to the public.").
62. Cf N.J. Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Gruzen P'ship, 592 A.2d 559, 561 (N.J. 1991); De-
velopments in the Law, supra note 50, at 1252 ("[T]he argument that the rigors of statutes of
limitations should not be applied to overworked government officials is difficult to square
with the universal limitations on the government's taxing and penal functions. . . .").
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public to monitor, identify, prove, or understand." Successful ad-
verse-possession against government, however, would showcase, in
easily understood and fairly attention-grabbing form, plain exam-
ples of significant government failure. Government officials need
maintain only exceedingly minimal oversight in order to avoid los-
ing public property. Successful adverse possession would
demonstrate that they had failed to achieve this minimal level of
competence. After property has been lost by adverse possession,
the public can, of course, buy it back, and for the re-purchase price
it has bought itself an early and clear warning that something in its
management of its government has gone seriously wrong.
Though successful adverse possession against the government
may result from the failure of individual public employees, its oc-
currence despite the competent and honest performance of public
servants would point to a failure of policy-to the desire of the
public and/or of government leaders for government to do more
than the resources dedicated to government will permit. Such a
policy failure will result in the government having too few re-
sources to fulfill all of the obligations that attend its plans, thus
leaving some duties undone. No doubt mismatches of this sort al-
ways exist to some extent. Where they are significant, however, they
will result in significant waste and frustration. Consider, for in-
stance, a town that holds large tracts of land at its borders, with
elected officials promising, and the public expecting, that the land
will be put to some specific purpose (say an industrial park or a
conservation district). The elected officials have not sought, how-
ever, nor has the public granted, sufficient resources to achieve the
stated purpose. This is bad enough. If the mismatch between ex-
pectations and resource-dedication (or government competence)
grows so large that even monitoring against long-term trespassers
proves impossible for the town government (or an unwarranted
application of limited manpower), however, and continues for the
whole of an adverse-possession period, then the expecta-
63. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory,
87 CORNELL L. REv. 280, 290 (2002) ("[I]n the public sector, it is much more difficult to
identify the constraints that deter politicians and bureaucrats from engaging in corrupt or
selfish policies. Even worse, collective action problems, such as rational ignorance, cause
citizens in democracies to tolerate poor governmental performance until it becomes ration-
al for voters to displace the incumbents."). As Impert notes, though government
competence and incompetence, and use or misuse or disuse of property, is as important to
strong economic and social health as are private uses, government lacks many of the incen-
tive and oversight structures that apply to corporations and non-profits, which have similar
diffuse-ownership and managerial-oversight problems. Impert, supra note 38, at 464-65.
Adverse possession provides some incentive for competence in planning and execution, and




tions/resources gap has effectively locked away the land in essen-
tially permanent limbo. In such circumstances an outside
intervention like adverse possession of the property will prove a
long-term good for the community. The new possessor will be able
to put the property to effective productive or conservational use,
while the public will be awakened from its unrealistic expectations
and free to move forward on a more coherent policy path.
A rather spectacular example of this phenomenon arises from
New York City. By the mid-1990s the city held more than 2,000 va-
cant buildings, "including some 17,000 individual dwelling units
that ha[d] been vacant for decades," many without the city's
knowledge much less under its competent monitoring." These va-
cant holdings became "magnet[s] for both the city's growing
homeless population and drug dealers and vandals."6 5 Where
squatter communities took over in areas of the Lower East Side,
however, these communities often "became thriving, freestanding
communities of otherwise law-abiding citizens.... Those squatters
often took buildings that were eyesores and public nuisances at
best-and were often dire threats to public safety-and trans-
formed them into clean, renovated, and functioning housing."6 6
Another argument against relinquishing nullum tempus in the
adverse-possession context has been that whereas in the tort and
contract context a continuation of sovereign immunity would re-
sult in government agents not being held liable for their wrongful
acts, to the continuing detriment of injured parties, no such con-
cerns arise with reference to adverse possession." As will be
considered further below,68 these characteristics apply in the ad-
verse-possession context as well. As in the cases of tort or contract
breach, failure to apply the adverse-possession remedy upon ter-
mination of the statutory period would result in shielding
government and its officers from the consequences of their errors
in policy or administration, while depriving the would-be adverse
possessor of an earned reward for serving a valuable public pur-
pose.
64. Gardiner, supra note 16, at 144.
65. Duhl, supra note 45, at 242.
66. Id.; see also Eduardo Mois6s Pefialver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA.
L. REV. 1095, 1123-25 (2007) (recounting New York's and Philadelphia's incompetence in
dealing with these properties).
67. Latovick, supra note 36, at 488, 504.
68. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text (detailing the community-benefitting
effects of trespass, occupation, and use by citizens on government-held property that would
otherwise sit disused and effectively abandoned).
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B. The Government-Only Exclusion from Adverse Possession Neither
Theoretically nor Practically justified, nor Equitable
The exclusion of government property from adverse possession
fails on a second ground. An argument that would successfully de-
fend the exclusion must demonstrate why government property
holding will be uniquely damaged by the application of the doc-
trine in ways that non-government property holdings, subject to
adverse possession, will not. The arguments of this type that have
been proffered thus far fail that test.69 Professor Latovick has as-
serted, for instance, that "as state resources become increasingly
scarce," given increasing demands on the public fisc, "protecting
state land from adverse possession by law is a relatively easy and
inexpensive way to ensure that the state retains the land it has"
without the expense of "monitoring [its] land [or] bringing eject-
ment actions to clear them.,7 0 As a period of declining budgets for
government (and indeed for everything else) has surely returned,
this concern might again have resonance-but for its failure to ac-
count for the true cost and effect of sequestering abandoned lands
or other "increasingly scarce" property, be it owned by government
or private parties. Increasing scarceness affects not just the state as
owner, but all actual and potential property owners. The "increas-
ing scarceness" of a type of property, or of property generally, adds
to the value and importance of the transfer of property to entities
69. Impert, supra note 38. Impert reviewed various efforts in case law to justify gov-
ernment exemption from adverse-possession doctrine. In each case, he rightly found the
explanations wanting, largely because the distinctions claimed were illusory. He noted, for
instance, some courts' reliance on the claim that "[t]here can be no rightful permanent
private possession of a public street. Its obstruction is a nuisance, punishable by indictment.
Each day's continuance thereof is an indictable offense, and it follows, therefore, that no
right to maintain it can be acquired by prescription." Id. at 453 (quoting BYRON K. ELLIOTT
& WILLIAM F. ELLIOTr, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ROADS AND STREETS 968 (2d ed. 1900));
see also 3 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 1188, at 1889 (5th ed. 1911); Latovick, supra note 36, at 484 (quoting ELLIorr & ELLIOT,
supra) (citing Heddleston v. Hendricks, 40 N.E. 408, 410 (Ohio 1895)). But this does not
follow. Any trespass that could lead to adverse possession will remain, up until the moment
when new title is acquired, an actionable and potentially indictable offense. Similarly,
though the ultimate interest in public property lies diffusely in the members of the public
themselves, this distinction does nothing to differentiate public lands from private. The
public has the final interest in public property,just as shareholders have the final interest in
corporate property. In both instances, the diffuse interest holders employ managers to over-
see their interests, and are bound by the managers' actions and by the quality of their
stewardship. There is here no distinction by which to hold shareholders liable for picking
incompetent managers, dedicating too few corporate resources to monitoring corporate
property, or holding more property than can be monitored, while excusing the public from
those same responsibilities. Latovick, supra note 36, at 485; Impert, supra note 38, at 459-61
(citing Commonwealth v. Alburger, I Whart. 469 (Pa. 1836)).
70. Latovick, supra note 12, at 975.
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capable of effectively using or preserving the property. Similarly, it
is most important that resources be used or conserved effectively
and efficiently at times of economic hardship. To the extent that
governments, because of declining resources, "will have fewer dol-
lars for monitoring their land," they, like all other owners, will
surely as well have fewer resources for using or preserving that
land. It is precisely in these times that the need for adverse-
possession against government, along with all other owners, is
greatest, and the total social cost of excluding government from
the rules of adverse possession is highest.7'
Some states have defended the government exclusion by assert-
ing that property dedicated to public use or trust is inalienable.
This argument initially seems a tautology: the property is untrans-
ferable because it is untransferable. At a deeper level, however, it
presents a welter of confusion and incoherence. First, it confuses
the authority to do something with the ability to do it. If a farmer
gives his son the family cow with the injunction: "for heaven's sake,
don't lose this cow, or do anything with it but sell it at market,"
then the son lacks the authority to trade the cow for magic beans,
to let it wander off into the woods, or otherwise to disobey his in-
structions. He does not, however, lack the ability to do those things.
Similarly, even if it is true that government officials lack permission
to transfer public property, this prohibition says nothing about
whether those same officials have the ability, by misfeasance or
negligence, to ignore and thus potentially abandon public proper-
ty to persistent trespassers, and thus lose the property by adverse
possession; nor does it provide anything other than a conclusory
assertion for excepting government, uniquely, from the adverse-
possession process.
71. See, e.g., Risch, supra note 39, at 218 (considering economic advantages flowing
from the transfer of land from effective-abandonment disuse by government to productive
use by other land holders); Impert, supra note 38, at 465-67 (same). Latovick also argues
that "[p]reventing adverse possession of state land ... avoids confrontation with trespassers.
The state is not forced to oust trespassers to protect its interest and thus can avoid the risks
involved in ejectment actions." Latovick, supra note 12, at 975. This argument is incorrect
unless the government has both completely and perpetually abandoned the trespassed property.
If the abandonment has been something less than complete and perpetual, then the tres-
passers will still have to be ejected-just some significant time down the road, when the
trespassers' and third-parties' expectations and reliance interests and sunk costs and legiti-
mate claims to the property have flourished and multiplied. If, meanwhile, the
abandonment has been both complete and perpetual, then no countervailing advantage can
ever arise to compensate for the costs and injustices flowing from the government's refusal
to permit the adverse-possession mechanisms to run.
72. See Latovick, supra note 36, at 483-84 (citing Montgomery Cnty. v. Maryland-
Washington Metro. Dist., 96 A.2d 353, 357 (Md. 1953); Delmar W. Doddridge, Distinction
Between Governmental and Propriety Functions in Municipal Corporations, 23 MICH. L. REv. 325,
332 (1925)).
SPRING 2011 ] 583
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Additionally, the justification is either pretextual or insupporta-
ble. It is pretextual if it means that government property
"dedicated to public use" is inalienable, while other government
property differently dedicated (held, for instance, in the govern-
ment's proprietary capacity) is not-with government officials
declaring which is which. (This is particularly true because, by def-
inition, any land that has been trespassed and occupied long
enough to have been rendered amenable to adverse possession will
not actually have been used for any government or public purposes
at all for quite some time.) It is unsupportable if it means that all
government property is inalienable, or that no government official
enjoys the power to alienate or re-designate any property once it
has been dedicated to the public use. If either of these were so, the
result would be ever-increasing concentration in public hands of
property held without regard to current public need or resources,
and without consideration of private-sector needs or abilities to
make use of the permanently cloistered property.7
Nor do practical considerations about the government's relative
ability to use or monitor its holdings, in this technological and bu-
reaucratic age, successfully distinguish government property
holdings from private, or provide a necessity justification for the
government exclusion. This impracticability argument, perhaps
the argument of oldest American pedigree, springs originally from
Lindsey v. Lessee of Miller. In that case a settler had moved onto
land in the Ohio Territory in 1783, had it surveyed, and occupied
it. The settler bore a land warrant issued by the Commonwealth of
Virginia in recompense for service in the Virginia militia during
the Revolutionary War. The Court determined that the warrant
could not grant title to the Ohio Territory land, thus leaving the
73. These objections apply in spades to claims that "land subject to a public trust may
not be acquired by adverse possession, without regard to whether the land is alienable."
Latovick, supra note 36, at 484 (citing Thurston v. City of Forest Park, 89 S.E.2d 509, 511
(Ga. 1955); Town of Chouteau v. Blankenship, 152 P.2d 379, 383 (Okla. 1944)). If property
"subject to a public trust" is said not to be alienable, the analysis above applies directly. If,
however, such property is alienable by public officials, then those officials have not only the
ability but also the authority to remove the public-trust designation from the property. If
officials have both the ability and the authority to change the designation of property by
sale, then there arises no reason why they should be excused any changes in the designation
of property that arise from their abandonment of that same property through adverse pos-
session, particularly given the presumably heightened duty of careful monitoring and
maintenance owed by such officials to specially designated "public-trust" property.
74. Lindsey v. Lessee of Miller, 31 U.S. 666 (1832).
75. See id. at 672 ("The defendants offered in evidence a patent issued by the com-
monwealth of Virginia, in March 1789, to Richard C. Anderson, for the same land, which
was rejected by the court. They then gave in evidence an entry and survey of the land, made
in January 1783, which were duly recorded on the 7th of April in the same year; and proved
possession for upwards of thirty years.").
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settler only an adverse-possession claim against a later claimant
who enjoyed good title issued by the United States. The Court
rejected the notion that the settler's occupation could defeat the
United States' ability to issue an original title to the property. It
embraced the "well settled principle that the statute of limitations
does not run against a state."" Its reasoning: if the statute, and thus
adverse possession, applied, "the public domain would soon be ap-
propriated by adventurers" because "it would be utterly
impracticable, by the use of any power within the reach of the gov-
ernment, to prevent this result."'
This practical eighteenth- and nineteenth-century justification
for retaining the regal trappings of nullum tempus to protect the
frontier lands of the young American Republic has long since ex-
pired. In the first years of the Republic, the federal government
owned some 230 million acres of frontier land, more than 50% of
the then-total area of the United States,o with the government land
holdings soon to grow by another half-billion acres (to about 80%
of the then-total81 ) in 1803 with the Louisiana Purchase.82 Even be-
fore the purchase, a single trip from the seat of government at
Philadelphia to the outer reaches of the 1800 Republic took weeks.
After the purchase, such a trip required the years-long efforts of the
Louis & Clark expedition.4 The technologies available for monitor-
ing these vast tracks of undeveloped government property were little
more than horsepower, shoe leather, and eyesight, and the man-
power with which to undertake such efforts was equally limited; the
76. See id. at 670-73.
77. Id. at 673.
78. Id.
79. ERNEST C. BAYNARD, III, PUBLIC LAND LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.3, at 4 (1986).
80. Top 10 Nation-Building Real Estate Deals, SMITHSONIAN MAGAZINE (Sept. 07, 2009),
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/Top-10-Nation-Building-Real-Estate-
Deals.html (noting that from 1783 until 1803, the United States owned approximately
490,000 square miles of the 830,000 square-mile landmass of the United States).
81. BETSY A. CODY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-599 ENR, FEDERAL LAND MANAGE-
MENT AGENCIES: MANAGEMENT OF OUR NATION'S LANDS AND RESOURCES 1 (1995).
82. See BAYNARD, supra note 79, § 1.5, at 5-6.
83. As late as 1783 the journey from Boston to New York via stage coach took from a
week to ten days, a much shorter distance on well-established roads. 3 THE UNITED STATES:
ITS BEGINNINGS, PROGRESS AND MODERN DEVELOPMENT (Edwin Wiley ed., 1912). No signif-
icant East-West road was even begun until construction of the National Road began in 1806.
James M. Rubenstein, Roads, in 7 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 175-80 (Stanley I.
Kutler, ed., 3d ed. 2003). The trip to the western boundary of the Republic was thus one
largely over track, trail, and forestland from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, and then down the
Ohio to the junction with the Mississippi.
84. It took the expedition more than a year to travel merely from St. Louis to the con-
tinental divide, the western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase. The trip to the Pacific took
approximately eighteen months. See JULIE FANSELOW, TRAVELING THE LEWIS AND CLARK
TRAIL 290 (3d ed. 2003).
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entire civilian workforce of the federal government numbered only
2000-4000.85 The turn of the twenty-first century presented a rad-
ically different picture. The size of federal holdings had declined
in absolute terms to about 650 million acres (about 28% of the
country's surface area) , while the federal workforce had explod-
ed to more than 2.7 million civilian personnel, and travel time
across the country had shrunk to a matter of hours. (State
and municipal payrolls grew congruently over the period.")
Meanwhile, the means by which public servants could monitor gov-
ernment lands-photograph, video, and satellite technologies being
just three-had multiplied, and the costs of such monitoring had
plummeted. In the years since the turn of the twenty-first century
those monitoring tasks have become even easier and cheaper; any
modern citizen can gain a bird's eye view of virtually any tract of
land in the country simply by logging on to the universally availa-
ble Google Earth, among other resources.9o
Positing a modernized version of this argument, Professor
Latovick has argued that municipal centers suffer a particular chal-
lenge in monitoring and effectively employing urban parcels seized
for tax default.9 ' The technological improvements that lessen the
burden of monitoring in the countryside, though, have similar
ameliorative effect in many urban contexts; Google Earth provides
city views as well.9 2 To the extent that the challenges of monitoring
85. R.A. BROWN, THE PRESIDENCY OFJOHN ADAMS 33 (1975) (estimating "apparently
no more than two thousand" employees); FORREST MACDONALD, THE PRESIDENCY OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 34-35 (1976) (estimating around 4000 employees, including 3000 post
office employees).
86. See CODY, supra note 81, at 1; see also ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & GEORGE COGGINS,
MODERN PUBLIC LAND LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1, 6-7 (2d ed. 2001).
87. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT BY FUNC-
TION: DECEMBER 2007 (2007), http://www2.census.gov/govs/apes/07fedfun.pdf. For total
federal government employment figures from 1962 to 2008, see U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MGMT., TOTAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1962, http://www.opm.gov/feddata/
HistoricalTables/TotalGovernmentSincel962.asp.
88. Though state and local payroll figures for 1800 are sketchy, current state payrolls
exceed 5.2 million employees, while local governments employ more than 14 million em-
ployees. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 87. This represents approximately four times as
many employees as there were Americans in 1800. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES (1801), available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/
1800-return-whole-number-of-persons.pdf.
89. See, e g., Stake, supra note 10, at 2446-48 (considering rapidly decreasing monitor-
ing costs).
90. See generally GOOGLE EARTH, http://earth.google.com.
91. See Latovick, supra note 36, at 488.
92. See generally GOOGLE EARTH, supra note 90. Most of these images are one to three
years old, well within the statutory period, and are updated regularly. See Blurry or Outdated
Imageiy: Data and Imagery, GOOGLE EARTH, http://earth.google.com/support/bin/
answer.py?answer=21417 (last updated Oct. 13, 2010). The service provides those in charge
586 [VOL. 44:3
Abandonment & Recapture
increase in urban environments, moreover, so too increase the
need for non-negligent management of urban properties by their
owners and the cost of owner negligence-whether the owners be
government or private. The effective abandonment of a rural plot
will not necessarily lead to the deterioration of the quality and val-
ue of surrounding land holdings. In higher-density settings,
however, neglect of disused properties can lead to rapid diminish-
ment of property values and safety in the surrounding
communities." Government failure to use, repair, sell, and even
monitor urban properties for the whole of the statutory period
could well devastate these communities, causing costs and losses to
the general public every bit as relevant as those revenues lost to the
fisc if the fall of nullum tempus were to result in adverse possession
of those properties. It is far better for a community that its gov-
ernment's neglect of its property be mitigated by occupation by
benign trespassers bent on maintaining the property, behaving like
good citizens, and avoiding the attention of negligent or distracted
public officials for the length of the statutory period. Trespassing
and occupation by persons antithetical to the good order of the
community, meanwhile, constitutes exactly the sort of danger likely
to arise from long-term neglect of government property. Such tres-
passing will of course presumably force public expenditures on
monitoring of the public property-but only remedially, after the
damage to the neighborhood has occurred; a government too pe-
nurious or incompetent to respond to the misuse of government
property even in these circumstances has no business owning such
property for any period of time. As for which type of trespassers
of monitoring a practical, cost-effective, publicly available way to stay apprised of possible
adverse-possession attempts. And, of course, access to Google hardly exhausts even the free,
publicly available tools that government can access to use and monitor its property. See, e.g.,
Brian Craig, Online Satellite and Aerial Images: Issues and Analysis, 83 N.D. L. REv. 547 (2007).
93. See, e.g., RESEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY, BLIGHT FREE PHILADELPHIA: A PUBLIC-PRIVATE
STRATEGY TO CREATE AND ENHANCE NEIGHBORHOOD VALUE 21-22 (2001),
http://astro.temple.edu/-ashlay/blight.pdf; Ayse Can, GIS and Spatial Analysis of Housing
and Mortgage Markets, 9 J. HOUSING REs. 61, 63-69 (1998), http://www.
knowledgeplex.org/kp/text -document summary/scholarly.article/relfiles/jhr_-0901 can.pdf;
see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing the neglect of government-owned
buildings in New York City and re-conquest and revival by squatters).
94. A government that lacks the resources or competence to monitor and provide
stewardship of public property even when such property has been actively occupied by tres-
passers who have violated the community's peace has abdicated its central obligation to
ensure public safety. Its only acceptable option in such circumstances would be to transfer
the property to the ownership of some entity capable of rendering it something other than a
bastion of disorder. A government acts with similar, if less flagrant, improvidence if it owns
so much more property than it is capable of managing that it cannot even identify its hold-
ings. Latovick argues that municipalities should not be subject to adverse possession because
"[i]n many cities the difficulty lies in identifying all municipally owned parcels and monitoring
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are likely to appear: the potential to take title by adverse possession
will provide incentives for the citizenly trespasser to invest time and
effort in occupation of the property; the lack of such incentive will
ensure that only those who have nothing to lose, and who plan to
make no investments in the property or the community, will have
any interest in invasion. This urban illustration, in fact, highlights
the myriad and serious real-world costs of continued government
abandonment of its responsibility for its properties, and of the pos-
itive contributions made by adverse possessors."
Finally, while government continues, at least in part, to resist ap-
plication of adverse-possession doctrine to its property holdings, it
has shown no reluctance to apply the doctrine to private property
for government benefit.96 This lopsided application of the doctrine
fails the simplest test of equity, and smacks not of a government of
limited authority protecting the interests of its constitutive citizens,
but of an independent plenary entity rigging the rules in its favor
in order to snap up property for its own advantage and its own
purposes.9 7 The one-way application of the adverse-possession doc-
those parcels to determine whether or not someone is encroaching." Latovick, supra note
36, at 489 (emphasis added); see also id. at 505-06 (noting potential value of overlooked
parcels as also significant). Something has gone seriously awry if a government cannot even
say what property it owns, and it has gone awry in a way that cannot help but seriously harm
the public-most likely and most emphatically those portions of the public that have to live
and work in the areas that receive the least public attention and investment. Adverse posses-
sion in such circumstances provides not an unacceptable encroachment on a competent
government's turf, but a minimal check against profound and potentially debilitating gov-
ernment failure.
95. A companion argument is that government exemption from adverse possession
must continue lest government efforts to preserve wild and conservation lands be jeopard-
ized. This claim is subject both to the objections raised to general arguments for nullum
tempus and to the critique of conservation-lands exceptions generally. See supra note 36-38. A
government that fails minimally to steward "wild lands," in the face of continuous, open,
notorious, and years-long trespass, has not achieved-or even fairly undertaken-an envi-
ronmental purpose; its claim is pretextual. A government that genuinely wishes to achieve
conserving use, but lacks the resources to provide necessary monitoring, acts responsibly
and achieves its purpose not by holding onto land it can neither conserve nor even monitor,
but rather by deeding that land to parties, such as conservation non-profits, with interests in
conserving the land, and with their good intentions secured by legal vehicles such as conser-
vation deeds or trusts. See supra note 38.
96. See, e.g., Impert, supra note 38, at 468-69. In fact, the federal government has not
even scrupled to apply adverse possession to state lands that passed to state title upon admis-
sion to the Union, overriding the state's own claims to sovereign immunity against such
adverse possession. See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273 (1983); Washington, supra note
59, at 775-77, 790-800 (discussing Block).
97. This fundamental theoretical injustice has predictable and practical justice-
denying effects. See, e.g., Sean D. Clarkson, Breaking the Curse of Vermont's Phantom Roads, VT.
B.J., Winter 2004-2005, at 28, 30 (recounting the plight of home owners threatened with
loss of property to the state on the basis of claims based on centuries-old and centuries-
abandoned dedications of roadways to the state of Vermont). Clarkson notes that "though
public highways may be established by dedication and acceptance [in Vermont], they may
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trine seems particularly problematic and perverse in the United
States in light of federal and state constitutional constraints against
government taking of private property without just compensation,
constraints under which private citizens do not labor.98
C. Abandonment & Recapture Theory and the Abolition
of the Government Exclusion
Adverse possession of government property thus fits nicely with-
in the abandonment-and-recapture framework articulated in
Section I. When a government fails to perform even the most cur-
sory monitoring of its property holdings over the statutory period,
it has effectively abandoned that property. Whether the abandon-
ment arises as a result of public-servant error, public-policy error, a
mismatch between public perceptions and fiscal realities, or oth-
erwise, the effect is to remove valuable and scarce resources from
any effective use or conservation efforts and to place those re-
sources in limbo. The public is necessarily badly served by such a
development, even if the fault lies partly with the public. The ad-
verse possessor, then, does the public a number of affirmative
services. First, the adverse possessor's trespass and capture demon-
strates to the public that something significant has gone wrong in
either its or its servants design or administration of public priorities.
Second, the adverse possessor's capture of the publicly abandoned
property withdraws the property from limbo and returns it to the
property stock. In most instances, the adverse possessor will keep
her new-forged title to the property the public had abandoned and
not be discontinued in the same or similar manner," resulting in "phantom roads" disused
since the eighteenth century arising to cloud title and deprive owners of property. Id.
98. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Selemba, The Interplay Between Property Law and Constitutional
Law: How the Government (Un)Constitutionally "Takes" Land Dirt Cheap, 108 PENN Sr. L. REv.
657 (2003) (concluding that compensation ought to flow to private parties whose lands pass
to government authorities by the working of adverse possession). It is not clear that the best
course would be to reverse the one-way application of the doctrine-to allow private entities
to possess against government, but not to allow government to possess against private citi-
zens. In fact, the internal logic of this Article suggests subjecting all owners to the
consequences of their abandonment and the consequent claims of new possessors. Adverse
possession by government, though, presents significant concerns in light of the takings-
compensation obligations under which American governments work. In particular, any
grant of authority permitting government to possess adversely against its citizens must be
structured to avoid allowing government opportunistically to evade its compensation obliga-
tions simply by entering as trespasser and essentially daring property holders to eject it.
Perhaps these concerns could be assuaged by requiring government to initiate compensa-
tion proceedings each time it trespasses or regulates in a way it reasonably concludes likely
to give rise to a takings-compensation claim, and by tolling the adverse-possession period in
all cases in which government fails to initiate such proceedings.
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will put it to her own productive or conservational uses, thus (pro-
portionally) invigorating the local economy or environment. In
these cases, especially in circumstances in which the public claim
has been long ignored and the private reliance upon settled expec-
tations has been extensive, the result will do basic justice to all
parties and will thwart opportunistic and improvident disruptions
engineered by public officials in search of transitory accumulations
to the public fisc." In some instances, the public-shocked awake
to its own or its servants' errors by the loss of the property-may
determine that the uses for which the property had initially been
held, though abandoned, must be recovered, and may therefore
find itself re-purchasing the adversely possessed lands from the
new owner so as to complete the long-forgotten purpose. In this
hypothetical instance, the cost of condemnation will constitute the
fee owed to the adverse possessor for exposing and effectively
obliterating the policy or personnel problems that had so long
stymied the property's intended public purpose.
Government, though, does not acquire only complete items of
property. It also acquires from private individuals specific incidents
and attributes of property ownership that constitute less than the
whole interest in an item of property, as by zoning regulations.
Similarly, it acquires liberty interests from individuals both by regu-
lation and by civil and criminal statute. The next section considers
whether, having swept aside the maxim of nullum tempus in the con-
text of complete property interests, governments would advance
the public interest and the cause of good government by introduc-
ing an analogue to adverse possession into its application and
enforcement of laws and regulations that impinge upon citizens'
property and liberty interests.
III. PUBLIC ADVERSE POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND LIBERTY
INTERESTS TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT RESTRICTION
As Section I demonstrates, the fundamental virtue of adverse
possession is that it provides a practical means of identifying the
effective abandonment of scarce resources, and awarding the
abandoned resources to the parties who both demonstrated the
abandonment and identified themselves as parties committed to
returning the property to either productive or conservational uses.
99. See, e.g., Clarkson, supra note 97, passim (discussing Vermont's attempts to seek for-
feiture of private property based on public roads platted in the eighteenth century, which
were soon-thereafter disused and forgotten).
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Section II then considered the wisdom of freeing adverse-
possession doctrine from the historical anomaly of nullum tempus
occurrit regi and applying it to government-held property.
Acceptance of these propositions provides a basis for yet more
valuable applications of the adverse-possession doctrine. In the
modern state, vast government effort flows to the regulation of
citizens' activities both business and personal. Each such re-
striction, whether regulatory or statutory, works a positive or
negative restriction on citizens' property or liberty interests, even
though it falls shy of the complete acquisition of any given article
of property.
Since the founding of the Republic some theorists have em-
braced a concept of property broad enough to include such
attributes of property ownership (which may be referred to as
"property interests," as distinct from complete property ownership
itself) and of individual liberty (i.e., liberty interests). o Many oth-
ers hesitate to define property so broadly.'o' Whether directly or by
analogy, however, an expanded conception of the doctrine of ad-
verse possession can play a role in the monitoring, moderation,
and mitigation of government acquisition of these property and
liberty interests from its citizens quite similar to that played in the
complete property-ownership context in the following manner. By
passing enactments that restrict liberty or property interests, gov-
ernment arrogates those interests to itself. Having done so, it obliges
itself to stop citizens from, as it were, trespassing on the interests that
it has formally claimed as its own and from which it has excluded
them. If government properly monitors the boundaries of its claim,
and regularly "ejects" or prosecutes "trespassers" (in the form of citi-
zens who violate the enactment by asserting their property or liberty
interests), then government thereby fulsomely "uses" its restrictions,
maintaining a viable claim to them. If, on the other hand, govern-
ment fails to patrol the boundaries of some given restriction over
an appropriate period, while citizens pervasively, openly, and
100. See, e.g., James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE (Phila.), Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted
in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 598 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)
("[Property] [i]n its larger and juster meaning ... embraces every thing to which a man may
attach a value and have a right; and which leaves to every one else the like advantage."); John Mar-
tinez, Wrongful Convictions as Rightful Takings: Protecting "Liberty-Property," 59 HASTINGS L.J.
515 (2008) (arguing that the inextricable link between liberty and property compels com-
pensation in wrongful convictions); Loren A. Smith, Life, Liberty & Whose Property?: An Essay
on Property Rights, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1055, 1056, 1063-64 (1996) (equating property rights
with civil liberty).
101. See, e.g., Steven Semeraro, Sweet Land of Property?: The History, Symbols, Rhetoric, and
Theory Behind the Ordering of the Rights of Liberty and Property in the Constitutional Lexicon, 60 S.C.
L. REV. 1, 7-9 (reviewing varying interpretations of the relationship between liberty and
property interests).
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notoriously trespass on government's claim to have restricted their
access to the property or liberty interest, then government will
have effectively abandoned its restriction, and thus its claim to the
relevant property or liberty interests. As in the more traditional
adverse-possession context, the abandoned interest then passes to
the hands of the trespassers-turned-new-owners-in this case, the
general public.
Significant benefit would flow from adapting adverse-possession
doctrine in this manner. Along with the massive expansion of gov-
ernment personnel detailed above'02 has come a concomitant
expansion of just the sort of restrictions of property and liberty in-
terests that this adverse-possession expansion is designed to target.
The Federal Register has famously grown to nearly 3 million pag-
es; 03 the federal criminal code grows relentlessly and explosively;04
state regimes have grown similarly.'05 Employing adverse-possession
doctrine as a moderating influence, one capable of pruning back
some of the more extravagant, unwieldy, or unintended-and at all
events widely ignored-manifestations of this restrictive under-
growth, will result in a significant decrease in sporadically and
haphazardly (if not willfully or maliciously) deployed government
restrictions on citizens' behavior.1 6
This proposed expansion of the doctrine proves rather less radi-
cal than it may initially appear. A trespasser may already earn
property interests less than that of complete ownership by means
of prescription, which is essentially adverse possession of easements
and related property interests in the use (but not the ownership)
of land.'7 These easements can include easements of passage along
102. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
103. As of February 25, 2010, the Federal Register totaled more than 2.9 million pages
excluding indices and "sections affected" lists. See OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, FEDER-
AL REGISTER PAGES PUBLISHED ANNUALLY (2008), http://www.1lsdc.org/attachments/
wysiwyg/544/fed-reg-pages.pdf.
104. See, e.g., ABA, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAw 7-11 (1997) (indicating that
nearly half of federal criminal statutes have been enacted in the past thirty years); WilliamJ.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MIcH. L. REv. 505, 514 (2001) (noting
that 183 federal offenses were included in the title on federal crimes in 1873, but that this
figure rose to over one thousand by 2000, with total federal offenses estimated at over three
thousand).
105. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 104, at 513-14 (showing massive growth in state crimi-
nal codes); see also Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEx. L. REv. 223, 224
n.3 (2007) (cataloging articles demonstrating comprehensive criminalization of conduct).
106. See infra Part IIA (detailing burdens arising from inconsistent and arbitrary regu-
lation); infra Part III.B (detailing the injustice arising from occasional prosecution of largely
dormant criminal statutes).
107. See generally STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 8.7, at 451-57 (citing Truc v.
Field, 169 N.E. 428 (Mass. 1930) (easements by prescription)). Prescriptive easements are
earned not when "the claimant occupies or possesses the disseisee's land," as in adverse
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certain strips of another's property (thus forbidding the property
owner from foreclosing the route of passage); easements of light
and air that flow in across another's property, or of view across an-
other's property (thus forbidding the property owner from building
in ways that obstruct the flow or the view); and related easements.'as
Conversely, underlying property owners can also adversely possess
easement interests held by others in their property.1 " With nullum
tempus retired, government will be subject to the adverse possession
not only of complete property interests, but of easements and
other use rights as well.
When private parties-and sometimes government-acquire
such interests they do so by purchase or transfer of individual in-
terests. Government, though, has an additional mechanism
available to it. When a zoning authority restricts building to a cer-
tain height, or requires setbacks of a certain distance, or limits the
footprint of building area permitted on a plot of land, it has essen-
tially obtained for itself an easement in the underlying property to
the extent of the restriction.110 With nullum tempus swept away, it
follows that easements taken in this manner should also be amena-
ble to adverse possession by underlying property owners. The
interesting question then becomes on whose behalf and by whose
efforts this "regulatory" adverse possession should occur. If treated
as an individual easement in every piece of property to which it
applies, the zoning regulation should be amenable to defeat by
each property owner for her own benefit; long disuse of the
zoning-regulation-based easement by the government (i.e., aban-
donment), combined with active trespassing on the easement by an
individual property owner (e.g., by building higher than the height
restriction or in front of the set-back) over the prescriptive period
would result in adverse possession by recapture of the easement
(or the relevant portion thereof) by the trespassing underlying
owner herself.
Zoning regulations are not, however, or are not only, individual
easements in each affected piece of property. They are also general
possession proper, but when "he makes some easement-like use of it ... for the period of
the statute of limitations," earning "rights that correspond to the nature of [the] use." Id.
§ 8.7, at 451.
108. See id. § 8.1, at 435 (easements for driveways, roads, rail lines, walkways, etc.); see al-
so Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 487 (1870); Stanton v. T.L. Herbert & Sons, 211 S.W. 353
(Tenn. 1919) (negative easements).
109. See, e.g., Rabinowitz v. Goldstein, 78 N.Y.S.2d 882, 883 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
110. Actually, zoning restrictions most resemble negative easements. See STOEBUCK &
WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 8.1, at 439-40 (describing negative easements). "Easement" is
used in the text for brevity's sake.
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regulations designed to affect an entire class of property."' It might
be argued, then, that the (or an additional) proper mechanism for
the adverse possession of the property interests asserted by gov-
ernment through zoning restrictions would be adverse possession
by the public on behalf of the public. In this model of adverse pos-
session, broad, persistent and open violation of a restriction by the
regulated public, coupled with administrative quiescence, would
result in abandonment of the restriction by that authority and ef-
fective return of the property interest to the public against whom
the restriction had previously applied.
This "group model" of regulatory adverse possession similarly
proves less radical than it may initially seem. Adverse possession of
property interests by the public as a result of collective activity al-
ready exists in American property law in the form of public
prescriptive easements.'12 Moreover, the model would merely adopt
and regularize waiver rules that have already developed in the con-
text of "private zoning" (which arises, for example, in places such
as subdivision developments) "3 for application to public zoning
and related regulatory regimes."' (Adopting the individual model
as well would regularize and provide a firm legal footing for equi-
table doctrines of estoppel and laches that have been applied
intermittently in both public and private zoning contexts."') The
current state of the law in these areas, and its applicability as a
foundation for the development of rules for adverse possession of
property and liberty interests taken by government regulation, are
addressed in Section III.A. below.
With regard to criminal statutes, meanwhile, this expansive vi-
sion of adverse possession both resembles and incorporates the
insights of the doctrine of desuetude, by which courts may refuse
111. See id. § 9.11, at 575 (quoting Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 118 A.2d 824 (N.J.
1955)).
112. See genemaUy RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.18 (2000) ("The
public may acquire servitudes by . .. prescription.... [T]he right to use the servitude bene-
fit extends to the public at large.").
113. See infra Part IIIA.1 (discussing restrictive covenants and waiver doctrine as applied
to restrictive-covenant enforcement).
114. Applying adverse possession to property interests acquired by government as a re-
sult of zoning regulations, and applying AP desuetude to liberty interests acquired as a result
of criminal enactments, discussed infra, can together serve as a model for applying adverse
possession to liberty or property interests acquired by government in regulatory contexts
other than zoning, and would be consistent with Dean Calabresi's expansive vision of desue-
tude as a tool by which courts might force legislatures to reaffirm or abandon potentially
obsolete legislation of all kinds. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A CoMMoN LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STATUTES 163-66 (1982). Space does not permit explicit exploration of such additional
applications in this Article, though.
115. See infra Part II.A2 (discussing the individual model and concluding that it pre-
sents unique challenges best addressed in a separate forum).
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to enforce (primarily criminal) statutes that prosecutors have long
ignored in the face of pervasive public violation." 6 Desuetude, like
adverse possession, rests on the recognition that interests can be
abandoned by neglectful claimants and recaptured by assertive new
possessors who had ostensibly been excluded from or denied the
relevant interests."' Desuetude enjoys little modem application"8
despite widespread scholarly support,"9 largely because of concerns
that its application would violate separation-of-powers require-
ments, discomfort with the indeterminate nature of the doctrine,
and difficulty in finding a constitutional locale for it.120 Developing
an adverse-possession rationale and mechanism for desuetude sig-
nificantly allays the relevant separation-of-powers concerns;
provides a ready-made set of rules, structures, and precedent by
which to govern desuetude; and de-constitutionalizes the process
of declaring a governmental withdrawal of private liberty or prop-
erty interests desuete. The history and content of the desuetude
doctrine, previous attempts to locate the doctrine in American le-
gal tradition, and the means, methods, effects, and benefits of
locating desuetude in an expanded conception of adverse posses-
sion are considered in Section III.B.
A. "Regulatory" Adverse Possession
1. Disuse and Violation of Private-Zoning Provisions
Many communities, including subdivisions and condominium
associations, established in recent decades have adopted covenant
restrictions. 2 ' These covenant restrictions serve essentially as freely
entered, contractually established zoning ordinances, setting
community standards such as limits on the acceptable uses of
property within the community (e.g., residential-use restrictions),
minimum set-backs and separations, and building footprints and
116. See infra Part III. B.
117. See infra Part III.B.1.
118. See Note, Desuetude, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2209, 2211 (2006) (noting that at present
"West Virginia alone recognizes desuetude as a valid defense" (citing Comm. on Legal Eth-
ics v. Printz, 416 S.E.2d 720 (W. Va. 1992))).
119. See infra Part III.B.1.
120. See infra Part III.B.1.
121. SeeJay M. Zitter, Waiver of Right to Enforce Restrictive Covenant by Failure to Olject to
Other Violations, 25 A.L.R.5TH 123 § 2[a] (1994). Private community restrictions have grown
in popularity in recent decades, but are not a wholly recent development. Instances of cove-
nant restrictions stretch back at least into the middle of the nineteenth century. See, e.g.,
Hanna v. Am. Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 639 N.E.2d 1326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (acknowledging
the creation of a restrictive covenant established in 1860).
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outbuilding limitations. 22 When robustly enforced, these covenant
restrictions receive wide judicial support, though courts tend to
construe ambiguous provisions against the more restrictive and in
favor of the freer use of the land.123 When enforcement grows in-
consistent or arbitrary, however, courts stand ready to deny further
enforcement. If a community allows persistent and widespread vio-
lations of a specific covenant provision, courts will often find the
community to have waived future enforcement of the restriction. 24
If a community allows a single violation to persist overlong, it may
find itself unable to complain later under a laches theory.125 If the
specific parties complaining about a violation of a covenant condi-
tion have themselves acquiesced to other instances of that violation
that were of similar scope and were similarly susceptible to their
knowledge, they will often not be heard to complain on grounds of
estoppel. 26
These bars to enforcement arise in equity.27 As is often the case
in equity, the standards for applying the enforcement restrictions
prove somewhat indeterminate and distinctly fact-based.128 As a
general matter, however, abandonment of a covenant restriction
will be found when the restriction has been violated by a sizeable
contingent of the community in ways available to the community's
observation.1 A course of violations will result in abandonment or
waiver only of the specific restriction violated, and only to the gen-
eral extent violated. '3o Thus, for instance, a community's
acquiescence in intrusions of up to seven feet into a required 50-
foot set-back worked an abandonment of the restriction only to the
extent of the extant incursions.'3 1 It did not result in complete
122. Zitter, supra note 121, § 2[a].
123. 39 AM.JUR. 3D Proof ofFacts § 4 (1994); see also Cordogan v. Union Nat'l Bank, 380
N.E.2d 1194 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
124. See Connelly v. Shafer, 837 S.W.2d 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); 39 AM.JUR. 3D Proof of
Facts § 16 (1996).
125. See, e.g., City of Forth Worth v.Johnson, 388 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex. 1964).
126. Connelly, 837 S.W.2d at 347-48.
127. See39AM.JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1 (1996); Zitter, supra note 121, § 2[a]. See general-
ly Preece Coal Co. v. Island Creek Coal Co., 111 F.3d 132 (6th Cir. 1997) (waiver, laches, and
estoppel are equitable defenses); Maksym v. Loesch, 937 F.2d 1237, 1247-48 (7th Cir. 1991)
(laches, generally).
128. See 39 AM.JUR. 3D Proof of Facts §§ 1, 4, 16 (1996); Zitter, supra note 121, § 2[a] at
144.
129. 39 AM.JUR. 3D Proof ofFacts § 16 (citing Landen Farm Cmty. Serys. Ass'n v. Schube,
604 N.E.2d 235 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)).
130. See id. §§ 16,17.
131. See Hanna v. Am. Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 639 N.E.2d 1326, 1329, 1333 (111. App.
Ct. 1994) ("[E]very building on the south side of Deming ... violates the 50 foot setback
line from 5.61 feet to 6.78 feet.... A partial disregard of a building line restriction will not
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abandonment of the restriction so as to allow the construction
"flush to the sidewalk, with no setback remaining."1 3 2 Nor did the
community's acquiescence in the construction of some multiple-
family dwellings in the subdivision, or in the zoning for business
use of a single lot, result in the abandonment of the set-back re-
striction, or of all covenants generally. 13
Zoning regulations have been subject to some of these bars to
enforcement-but only some, and only sporadically. A zoning au-
thority may find itself estopped from enforcing a zoning regulation
when some particular and special act or omission of the authority
has caused a property owner reasonably to rely on the act or omis-
sion when violating the zoning restriction.3 It might also find its
enforcement barred by laches when the enforcing authority has
enjoyed knowledge of the relevant violation for an inordinately
long period, and has failed to act to suppress the violation. 5 In
general, though, the courts are wary of applying equity against
government at all.'3 6 They make exceptions primarily when the
zoning authority has made explicit assurances to a property owner
upon which the owner has detrimentally relied, rather than in cas-
es in which the property owner's claim arises from a demonstration
of long-standing quiescence. 3 7 Importantly, courts have rejected
claims that zoning authorities have waived their power to enforce
by acquiescence and inaction in the face of violations.'38 They have
similarly rejected any claim that authority or permission to violate
long-unenforced zoning provision can arise as a matter of right.3 9
necessarily operate as an abandonment of it altogether, where a material and beneficial part
remains.").
132. Id. at 1327.
133. See id. at 1334-35.
134. See Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10, 15-16 (Fla.
1976); 25 AM.JUR. 3D Proof ofFacts § 2 (1994).
135. 25 Am. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts §§ 2, 14 (1994); cf Cannon v. City of Durham, 463
S.E.2d 272, 274 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (applying doctrine of laches to a citizen's suit challeng-
ing city's purchase of land and construction of a ballpark).
136. See, e.g., Guar. Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938); Arthur E. Bon-
field, The Abrogation ofPenal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IOWA L. REv. 389, 418 (1963) ("[I]t
is [generally] said that an estoppel will not run against the state."); Mary V. Laitos, Danielle
V. Smith & Amy E. Mang, Equitable Defenses Against the Government in the Natural Resources and
Envrironmental Law Context, 17 PACE ENTL. L. REv. 273 passim (2000). "[C]ourts are reluc-
tant to allow the application of equitable defenses against the government when their
application would defeat the public interest, even if the result confers an unfair advantage
onto the government.... [C]ourts generally define the public interest very broadly, making
it difficult to successfully prevail on these defenses against the government." Id. at 273-74
(footnotes omitted).
137. Compare 25 AM.JUR. 3D Proof ofFacts § 2 (1994), with id. § 14.
138. See id. § 14.
139. Id. § 3.
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Adoption of adverse-possession doctrine in the zoning-
regulation context would fill these gaps. It would provide a mech-
anism by which waiver-like arguments could be raised against the
regulating authority. As discussed above, non-enforcement of a
restriction in the face of widespread, open violation would result in
adverse-possession of the property interest (i.e., the right to violate
the restriction free of zoning-board consequence) by the relevant
regulated community, thus employing the power of the public pre-
scriptive easement in the post-nullum tempus world. 140 It would also
provide a legal (rather than merely an equitable) footing for waiv-
er theory (and possibly for estoppel and laches theories as well, if
the individual regulatory adverse-possession model were also
adopted), resulting in more robust and more predictable restraints
on enforcement following long periods of violation and non-
enforcement. Finally, it would provide clear and reliable mechanics
of enforcement by adopting the well-established elements and
mechanisms of adverse possession.
2. The Mechanics of Regulatory Adverse Possession
As discussed above, the property interests government acquires
by enacting zoning restrictions are essentially easements.4' Adverse
possession of easements and other use interests in property is
called prescription,' and proceeds by elements slightly modified
from those of standard adverse possession to fit the use-right con-
text.'4 3 To find transfer of a property interest by prescription, courts
look primarily for "actual, open, notorious [and] hostile ... use" of
the property interest; the "continuous" and "exclusive" elements
have diminished and modified meanings consistent with the use-
right objects of prescription.1'
In the prescription context, the actual use required is use of the
kind for which the easement will be established (or, alternatively,
use which renders impossible an easement-holder's use of that
easement) .145 Would-be adverse possessors of property interests that
the government assumes by zoning restriction will show actual use
140. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing the public adverse-possession
model and the public prescriptive easement).
141. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing the easement nature of zon-
ing restrictions).
142. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing prescription).
143. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 8.7, at 452, 455-56 (citing Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Vulles, 437 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1971)).
144. See id.
145. See id. § 8.7, at 452-53.
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of the restricted property interest by violating the restriction. Thus,
for instance, an adverse possessor will actually use-or rather, tres-
pass upon-a zoning restriction limiting building heights to thirty
feet by building higher than that limit.
Open and notorious use leading to prescription is essentially the
same as that leading to adverse-possession proper.14 6 Most zoning
violations will be open and notorious by nature, as with violations
of set-back and height restrictions; only those which can be con-
ducted without public visibility or public knowledge could pose any
difficulty in this regard. Thus, for instance, while a violation of a
single-family residence ordinance (setting aside the ordinance's
potential constitutional problems1 4 7 ) might create no public edi-
fice, it would be susceptible to public knowledge so long as the
unrelated residents made no secret of their relationship or of their
arrangements. If, however, the violation consisted of the installa-
tion of a forbidden septic system that the owners had installed in
the dead of night, objection should arise on open-and-notorious
grounds.
Hostility requires that the trespass occur without permission of
the record owner. 48 In the zoning context, government has made
itself the record owner of the negative easements in question by
prescribing the underlying property owners' otherwise legal and
practical uses of their property. Hostility to the record owner, then,
requires actual violation of the zoning-restriction-created easement.
Securing a variance or other formal legal sanction will foreclose
hostility. Securing a zoning permit that conforms to the re-
strictions, however, and then building beyond the permission
granted, or obtaining a permit that authorizes building in excess of
the zoning regulations would both constitute hostility.
The exclusivity requirement is substantially relaxed in the pre-
scriptive context. The trespassing user need show only that uses by
others, including the record owner, do not interfere with the tres-
passer's own actual use."'9 Prescriptive continuity is likewise relaxed;
it requires only "frequency of use ... normal for the kind of ease-
ment claimed."' Zoning violations that create a permanent
structure or physical feature-violations of height restrictions and
set-backs, for instance-or that constitute a continuing feature,
146. See id. § 8.7, at 456.
147. See id. § 9.7, at 552-54 (citing Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974)).
148. See id. § 8.7, at 453 (citing Rettig v. Kallevig, 936 P.2d 807 (Mont. 1997)).
149. See id. § 8.7, at 455 (citing Fowler v. Matthews, 204 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947)).
150. See id. § 8.7, at 456 (citing Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Vulles, 437
F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1971)).
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such as on-going violations of use restrictions, should quickly satisfy
these elements.
Because adverse possession of property interests restricted by
zoning and other regulation so closely resembles prescription, the
adverse-possession periods employed by each jurisdiction in the
prescriptive-easement context can be adopted in the prescription-
against-zoning setting. Successful prescription would require
complete non-enforcement during the prescriptive period.
As noted above, the core value of integration of adverse-
possession theory into zoning regulation lies in its power to disable
future enforcement of regulations that the public has roundly
disobeyed and the enforcement authorities have effectively aban-
doned. As discussed, this public model closely resembles (or, argua-
arguably, is even a form of) a public prescriptive easement,'5 1 and
creates a mechanism largely similar to (but significantly more
structured than) waiver and abandonment in the private-zoning
context.5 2 As a result, the public model can draw extensively from
both of these sources. They provide a guide in answering questions
about the scope of the interest that should properly be adversely
possessed through the public process. When private zoning provi-
sions are waived, they are not waived completely; they are only
waived to the extent they have been violated and unenforced. 5 3
Public prescriptive easements create, at least in the wiser jurisdic-
tions, public-use rights limited to the actual uses and degree of use
to which the public has put the property without the owners' ob-
jection.
These rules provide sound guidelines for the public regulatory
adverse-possession model. Qualifying violations of a restriction
should bar enforcement of the restriction only to the extent of
those qualifying violations. Conversely, enforcement of a restriction
should serve to disrupt a continuing pattern of violation only with
regard to the type or magnitude of violation enforced against.
Thus, for instance, consistent qualifying violation of a 30-foot
height restriction by five to ten feet should result in abandonment
of the authority to enforce the height restriction up to a height of
forty feet-not complete abandonment of the height restriction
entirely. Likewise, a pattern of enforcement of a set-back regula-
tion only against gross violations (e.g., violations of more than
twenty feet) but of non-enforcement of lesser violations should
151. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
152. See generally supra Part IH.A.
153. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
154. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.18 cmt. c (2000).
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result in abandonment of the authority to enforce the restriction at
those smaller distances; enforcement in certain specific circum-
stances should not bar adverse-possession of interests resulting
from violations in materially different circumstances to which the
authorities acquiesced throughout the prescriptive period.
The example of private-zoning waiver also provides useful con-
tent to answer the dilemma of how many qualifying violations must
occur without objection throughout the prescriptive period before
abandonment will be found. While those equitable determinations
have established no fixed minimum quantity of violation, they have
established that isolated or rare violations neither provide suffi-
cient opportunity for the public to have demonstrated its general
rejection of the regulatory stipulation nor give the authorities suf-
ficient notice of general violation or opportunity to respond
aggressively.'"5 Enough violations would have to occur to demon-
strate a general (though not necessarily complete) public
disregard for the restriction and a manifest (though not necessarily
conscious) disregard of the violations by the authorities.
This raises the question of the private model-whether individ-
uals who violate property-interest-restricting regulations should be
able to adversely possess the restricted property interest for them-
selves as a result of their solo violations. Some support for
extending the doctrine to individual violations arises from the eq-
uitable doctrines of laches and estoppel-currently applied in both
the public and private zoning contexts-which focus on individual
rather than collective violations, and from the arguments from
fundamental fairness that underlay those doctrines.tb In the nor-
mal course of things, individuals can also adversely possess
easements in their land held by others, including-but for nullum
tempus-government.1 5 7 Nevertheless, property interests that arise
in government as a result of regulation differ fundamentally from
property interests that arise in government as a result of purchase
or other individual claim. The explicit purpose of regulation is to
establish a generally applicable negative easement in the property
of all members of a community, ostensibly for the reciprocal bene-
fit of all burdened members of the community. Establishing a
method of individual withdrawal from this structure (potentially,
eventually) by right could seriously undermine the entire project.
Moreover, it would open the door to malfeasance on the part of
155. E.g., 39 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 16 (1996) (citing Stephenson v. Perlitz, 537
S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)).
156. See, e.g., 25 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts §§ 4, 14 (1994) (citing Perry v. State, 512
N.E.2d 841 (Ind. 1987)).
157. See generally supra Part II.
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favoritism-seeking property owners and favoritism-granting officials
who, for whatever inducement, prove willing to overlook some in-
dividual violations while enforcing against others, thus keeping the
general property-interest restriction alive and applicable to the
community at large. Any private model, therefore, would require
significant additional safeguards and considerations to prove both
equitable and just. While such safeguards may exist, and might
render a private model viable and valuable, their discovery must
await some later consideration.
B. Adverse-Possession-Based Desuetude
1. Desuetude Thus Far
The doctrine of desuetude holds, roughly, "that statutes may be
abrogated not only by a vote of the legislator, but also by ... the
tacit consent of all."1 5 In the modern context this has been taken
to mean that "under some circumstances statutes may be abrogat-
ed or repealed by a long-continued failure to enforce them ... in
the face of a public disregard so prevalent and long established
that one could deduce a custom of its nonobservance."1 5 ' The doc-
trine's roots stretch back to the Code of Justinian, eo and it has
played a significant role in some civil-law traditions, especially that
of Scotland.' 6' However, its position within the common law has
always proven problematic. In both English and American prece-
112
dent, the doctrine has received occasional application, amidst a
general theme of suspicion and rejection.63 The logic of English
rejection is straight-forward, since "[t]he one fundamental dogma
of English constitutional law is the absolute legislative sovereignty
158. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 190 (2d ed. 1921)
(quoting DIG. 1.3.32.1 (Julian, Digest 84)). But see Mark Peter Henriques, Note, Desuetude
and DeclaratoiyJudgnent: A New Challenge to Obsolete Laws, 76 VA. L. REv. 1057, 1068 (1990)
("The definition of desuetude depends to some extent upon the author of the treatise or
opinion.").
159. Bonfield, supra note 136, at 394, 396.
160. See id. at 395 (citing the DIGEST OFJUSTINIAN, the INSTITUTES OFJUSTINIAN, and
the CODE OFJUSTINIAN as early examples of the doctrine).
161. Id. at 398-405 (detailing the doctrine's particular applicability in the German and
Scottish legal traditions, as compared to other Continental and British legal systems where it
has found less purchase).
162. See id. at 405A08, 423-28 (detailing applications of the doctrine in English legal
history and in American legal history, respectively).
163. See id. at 409 (citing historical instances of the doctrine's disapproval as a basis for
its rejection in modem British jurisprudence). For an extended discussion of the bases of
American objection to the doctrine, see infra notes 188-215 and accompanying text.
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or despotism of the King in Parliament."'6 Under the unwritten
English constitution, no party or body has the power to disregard a
parliamentary pronouncement on any grounds. 15
In the United States, of course, the constitutional system is com-
plicated by co-equal branches and the separation of powers,
rendering the objections to desuetude here more varied and per-
haps more confused. American courts now unquestionably enjoy at
least one arena in which they, unlike their English peers, can
"make rules which override or derogate from" legislative acts,'66 by
way of judicial review to vindicate constitutional imperatives. This
perhaps explains why many scholarly defenders of desuetude have
sought to ground the doctrine in the Due Process and/or Equal
Protection Clauses, thus constitutionalizing it.167
These scholars' attempts to find a place in the American legal
system for desuetude spring from basic considerations of justice
and fairness.
First, a very long-continued and well-settled failure to enforce
a widely-ignored statute is as much a positive expression of
public policy as would be its express legislative abrogation.
The reason for this is that such a protracted course of adminis-
trative conduct must at least reflect the electorate's
acquiescence to the provision's demise as effective law. Other-
wise, the politically responsive administrators of our penal laws
would have suffered-over such an appreciable period-the
consequences of their long disregard of public preference.
Second, when the community has acquiesced in an enact-
ment's long-continued administrative nullification by not
164. A.V. DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 145 (10th ed. 1959), quoted in Bonfield,
supra note 136, at 409. Of course, this justification sounds antiquated to modern American
ears, and, not incidentally, smacks more than a little of the authoritarian worldview from
which nullum tempus springs.
165. Id. at 40.
166. Id. (describing the English system of parliamentary supremacy).
167. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 143-56 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing desuetude in the context of the constitutional void-for-vagueness doc-
trine); Bonfield, supra note 136, at 409-18 (reviewing the connection between desuetude
and the equal protection and due process doctrines); Corey R. Chivers, Desuetude, Due Process
and the Scarlet Letter Revisited, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 449, 463-65 (1992) (locating desuetude in
the Due Process Clause); William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 34-38 (1996) [hereinafter Stuntz, Civil-Criminal] (locating a
constitutional doctrine of desuetude in substantive and procedural due process considera-
tions, and comparing it to a fundamental-rights/privacy inquiry); Stuntz, supra note 104, at
592 ("A constitutionalized desuetude doctrine would ... make criminal law and criminal
adjudication more transparent ... and hence more lawlike."); Cass R. Sunstein, What Did
Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 27 passim
(2003) (discussing the relationship between desuetude and procedural due-process theory).
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terminating it, the provision disappears as law in any mean-
ingful sense. It is neither observed nor enforced, and is
virtually eradicated from the legal consciousness of the body
politic. "[T] he most casual conversation of the citizens reveals
that such a statute is distinguished from, not confused with,
other elements of the legal system."'"
In fact, the failure to locate some rule of desuetude in the Amer-
ican system awards the executive branch an essentially plenary
power to disrupt any citizen's liberty at any time. "Since almost an-
yone, or everyone, may have breached a desuet[e] enactment, an
ever present ability to exhume and apply [such enactments] en-
dows the enforcement agencies with unfettered power to persecute
whomever they please for essentially unreviewable and most often
unprovable reasons."' 9
Under these scholars' proposals, the desuetude doctrine is anal-
ogized to the constitutional void-for-vagueness doctrine,'70 in both
its discretion-limiting and fair-notice obligations.'7 1 Some have also
considered the opportunities for equal-protection-denying invidi-
168. Bonfield, supra note 136, at 391 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted); see also
BICKEL, supra note 167, at 147-48, 150-53 (summarizing concerns about the lack of notice
provided by disused statutes, selective prosecution, and blackmail, and noting that a declara-
tion of desuetude would press a deadlocked legislature to address restrictions no longer
consistent with contemporary morality); MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, Dis-
CRETION To DIsoBEY 130-31 (1973) (raising fairness and reliance considerations as support
for the desuetude doctrine); Bonfield, supra note 136, at 392; Sunstein, supra note 167, at
49-50 (claiming that desuetude ensures "that unenforced laws [which] lack support in pub-
lic convictions ... may not be brought to bear, in what will inevitably be an unpredictable
and essentially arbitrary way").
169. Bonfield, supra note 136, at 414; see also Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling out the Rule of
Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1514 (2007) ("Because virtually everyone, acting conscientious-
ly and reasonably, violates traffic laws every time they drive, an officer can identify a crime to
justify a stop, search, interrogation, and arrest of virtually any motorist he chooses." (foot-
note omitted)); Linda Rodgers & William Rodgers, Desuetude as a Defense, 52 IOWA L. REV. 1,
5 (1966) (explaining that unenforced statutes "invite[] sporadic, discriminatory[,] ...
[u]neven and inadequate enforcement," which "is a certain formula for stimulating con-
tempt for the legal order"); Stuntz, Civil-Crimina4 supra note 167, at 35 ("By retaining
prohibitions that once were real crimes but have since lapsed (without being repealed), the
state can make a large portion of its citizenry criminals, giving police the ability to search or
arrest whomever they wish and prosecutors the ability to charge or threaten whomever they
wish."); Stuntz, supra note 104, at 592 ("[T]he unenforced crime's continued existence gives
the government the same strategic power that all overbroad crimes give: the power to in-
duce guilty pleas for other, more serious crimes that the government cannot prove.").
170. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 167, at 149; Bonfield, supra note 136, at 412-18.
171. Bonfield, supra note 136, at 412-15. Professor Bonfield analogizes desuetude to
"that line of due process and equal protection cases which declared statutes invalid because
they invested an administrative authority with plenary power to fix the lawfulness or unlaw-
fulness of defined particular conduct," and notes that "[t]he depth of the American
commitment to the abrogation of enacted law by desuetude is perhaps best revealed by
analogy to the due-process fair-notice or fair-warning cases." Id. at 412-13, 415.
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ous discrimination that emanate from a mass of long-unenforced,
routinely-flouted, yet unrepealed-and-still-enforceable directives.
Like the vagueness and notice rules, constitutional desuetude
would find its situs somewhere in, among, or between the Due
Process (substantive and/or procedural) and Equal Protection
Clauses.13
The mechanics of constitutional desuetude are in many regards
as amorphous as its exact textual location. Desuetude has oc-
curred, according to the formulation of Professor Bonfield (who
made a significant effort to formulate a constitutionally based
American desuetude doctrine), when "the act's violation has
repeatedly come to the notice of its administrators," without re-
sponse being taken, so as to demonstrate "a clear and conscious
administrative policy of total nonenforcement." 7' Additionally,
"the administrative failure to apply the statute to sufficient breach-
es of its provisions must be know[n] or apparent to the community
at which it is directed."'7 The executive's inaction must be "without
exception and protracted enough to establish a reasonable public
expectation that the conduct involved will no longer be pun-
ished."176
To this theoretical basis Bonfield added a number of content-
specific, yet still nebulous, supplemental considerations. These
included caveats that longer periods of nonenforcement would be
necessary if "active political conflict over the acceptability of' non-
enforcement accompanied the quiescence,' or if nonobservance
of the provision were "less notorious and widespread,"'7 8 while
"more notorious and widespread . .. nonobservance" would allow a
"relatively shorter" period of nonenforcement to suffice.'7 ' Bon-
field provided no metrics by which to determine the basic length
172. See, e.g., id. at 410-12 (discussing the difference between non-discriminatory exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion that passes muster under the Equal Protection Clause and
discriminatory enforcement that does not).
173. Professor Sunstein would locate his American-style desuetude in procedural due
process. See Sunstein, supra note 167, at 27. However, his formulation-desuete enforce-
ment of constitutionally important interests-necessarily invokes fundamental-interest
analysis that would force the inquiry well beyond pure procedural considerations. Accord
Stuntz, Civil-Criminal, supra note 167, at 37 (comparing constitutional desuetude to fun-
damental-rights analysis, and substantive and procedural due-process analysis); see also
infra notes 181-200, 208-216 and accompanying text (considering Professor Sunstein's
"important constitutional interests").
174. Bonfield, supra note 136, at 419.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 420.
178. Id. at 421.
179. Id.
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of abandonment required, no practical scale for making his rela-
tive adjustments, and no standard by which the relative notoriety of
nonobservance could be judged.'so
Similarly, Professor Sunstein, who has more recently attempted
to discern a hidden application of desuetude in the Lawrence v.
Texas"' decision, suggests that "a distinctly American variation" of
desuetude arises to inhibit prosecution "when constitutionally im-
portant interests are at stake ... if [the] criminal prosecution is
brought on the basis of moral judgments lacking public support, as
exemplified by exceedingly rare enforcement activity."1 2 He eluci-
dated: "any use of desuetude" under his theory, should "be limited
to certain interests that have a threshold of importance," and when
"those interests are implicated, the state may not rely on ajustifica-
tion that has lost public support."1 3 Sunstein recognized the need
to be able to define, under his theory, "interests that have a
threshold of importance,"'8 4 but failed to provide a means." Other
180. In fairness, Bonfield's model did include some concrete specifics. Desuetude
would be found, for instance, only if "[t]he nonenforcement [were] geographically congru-
ent with that body politic under whose authority it was promulgated.... [A]n adequate
failure to apply a state statute in several counties will not sufficiently deny fair warning of
that law's vitality to residents of those counties or the rest of the state." Id. at 420. Similarly,
Bonfield specified that "American penal statutes can be partially abrogated by desuetude
either as to their separable provisions or applications," id. at 421, and that once a provision
were judged desuete, re-enactment by the legislature would be required before the law
could again be enforced, id. at 422.
181. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
182. Sunstein, supra note 167, at 27-28.
183. Id. at 51 (footnote omitted).
184. See id. ("[W]e must have an antecedent way, to some extent independent of public
convictions, to determine whether an interest has some kind of constitutional status.").
185. See id. Sunstein suggested that Lawrence best be understood as employing his "des-
uetude, American style," in that
the Lawrence Court must have concluded that as a matter of principle, the right to
engage in same-sex relations had a special status in light of the Court's precedents
taken along with emerging public convictions-and that the moral arguments that
supported the ban were no longer sufficient to justify it.
Id. at 51-52. As a definition or metric of "interests that have a threshold of importance,"
however, this formulation fails as part dodge, part bootstrap. It is a dodge insofar as itjusti-
fies current decisions about "importance" on previous, precedential determinations of
importance without explaining or critiquing those determinations, or explaining the proper
means of determining-or rejecting-legitimate descent from those precedents, or explain-
ing why that list is both legitimate and complete. It is a bootstrap insofar as it bases the
"importance" justification on emerging "public convictions," because the emerging public
convictions are presumably themselves the cause of the exceedingly rare public enforcement
that constitutes the desuetude prong of his important-interests-plus-desuete-enforcement
formulation. See id. at 55-56. Sunstein in fact had a difficult time trying to describe the "im-
portant interest" that was, under his formulation, at stake in Lawrence itself. See id. at 60-72.
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scholars have also proved vague about the mechanics of desue-
tude. '
Some of these scholars have in fact suggested that some U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions of recent decades are best understood as
covert desuetude decisions,17 but the Supreme Court has refused
to embrace this position.' Rather, efforts to find a constitutional
footing for the desuetude doctrine have met with little practical
success and significant objection. Despite Professors Sunstein's,
Bonfield's, and Bickel's claims that Poe v. Ullman'55 was "really" a
desuetude decision, the plurality decision in that case never sug-
gested that the underlying criminal statute (forbidding
dissemination or use of contraceptive devices or information about
contraception'9 o) had grown unenforceable by long disuse. Rather,
it refused to determine the constitutionality of the statute essential-
ly because it predicted that Connecticut authorities would not, by
"tacit agreement,"' 9 ' exercise their still-extant authority to prose-
cute under the statute. 9 2 Even this suggestion, on discretionary
grounds, of a mechanism vaguely reminiscent of desuetude drew
from Justice Douglas a sharp exclamation in dissent that desuetude
is "contrary to every principle of American or English common
186. See, e.g., Stuntz, Civil-Criminal, supra note 167, at 37 ("Judges would have to make
substantive judgments based not on any structured legal analysis but on their own normative
intuitions."); Stuntz, supra note 104, at 597 ("[Desuetude [is] probably not susceptible to
detailed legal analysis. [The] doctrine[], if [it] ever exist[s], will likely be little more than an
accumulation of seat-of-the-pants judgments by particular trial judges and appellate pan-
els."). See generally Desuetude, supra note 118, at 2212-13 ("[Tlhere has not been a concerted
effort in the American judicial system to craft a doctrinal approach to desuete statutes that
can be broadly and easily applied.... This Note brackets these concerns for future scholars
or, better still, for judges applying the doctrine, and focuses instead on the more abstract
arguments for and against judicial abrogation of unenforced statutes.").
187. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 167, at 154 ("There might have been nothing amiss in
language a shade more explicit.... The consequence of the opinion, nevertheless, must be
that a prosecution of persons situated as are [plaintiffs] would fail on the ground of desue-
tude."); Bonfield, supra note 136, at 436 (characterizing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961),
as a de facto constitutional-desuetude case); Sunstein, supra note 167 passim.
188. Cf Bonfield, supra note 136, at 423-24 ("American courts seem to insist that a leg-
islative enactment cannot be rendered ineffective by nonuse or obsolescence, nor repealed
by the failure of those entrusted with its administration to enforce it." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
189. 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Frankfurter,J., plurality).
190. See id. at 498.
191. Id. at 508.
192. See id. at 501-08; see also id. at 529-30 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I think both the
plurality and concurring opinions confuse on this score the predictive likelihood that, had
they not brought themselves to appellee's attention, he would not enforce the statute
against them, with some entirely suppositious 'tacit agreement' not to prosecute, thereby
ignoring the prosecutor's claim, asserted in these very proceedings, of a right, at his un-
bounded prosecutorial discretion, to enforce the statute."); id. at 535-36.
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law."'" Douglas' admonishment accorded with the Court's pro-
nouncement in District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co.'"4 that
"[c]ases of hardship are put where criminal laws so long in disuse
as to be no longer known to exist are enforced against innocent
parties. But that condition does not bear on the continuing validity
of the law; it is only an ameliorating factor in enforcement."9
The prospects for constitutional desuetude have not demonstra-
bly brightened since those decisions. In Griswold v. Connecticut,"6
the culmination of the Connecticut contraceptive cases that began
with Poe v. Ullman, Justice Douglas for the Court unsurprisingly
gave no consideration to desuetude, instead declaring the enact-
ment unconstitutional on substantive-due-process grounds.' 7 And
though Professor Sunstein argues that Lawrence v. Texas'98 may best
be understood as an exposition of his "American-style" desuete en-
forcement of important constitutional interests9" the decision
certainly never styled itself an exercise of desuetude doctrine, nor
did the Lawrence Court's discussion adhere meaningfully to any co-
herent, recognizable vision of desuetude without labeling it as
such.2 00
193. Id. at 511 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
194. 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
195. Id. at 117. This is a somewhat cryptic assertion. Does it suggest that, as a matter of
constitutional desuetude, enforcement of long-disused statutes must be "ameliorated"? If so, to
what extent and under what conditions? The opinion provides no further elucidation of the
question. Rodgers & Rodgers read it to "suggest[] that mitigation of punishment is a salutary
device for softening the impact of the application of an ancient statute." Rodgers & Rodgers,
supra note 169, at 6.
196. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
197. See id. at 481-86.
198. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
199. Sunstein, supra note 167, at 27.
200. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558. As Sunstein recognized, the opinion was "re-
markably opaque." Sunstein, supra note 167, at 29. The majority opinion explicitly declared
itself to be basing its opinion on substantive due-process rather than equal-protection
grounds. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567, 573, 574-75. But it failed to indicate whether the
decision was based on rational-basis review or some sort of heightened scrutiny. See id.; Sun-
stein, supra note 167, at 46. A simple desuetude decision could therefore have been very
short indeed-but its effects would presumably have been limited to Texas. A simple-but-
national desuetude decision would have required extensive review of the enforcement of
anti-sodomy laws nationwide, but would not have required analysis of the substantiality of
the liberty interest involved. Sunstein's "American-style" desuetude formulation, of course,
requires desuetude + important interest, and would explain the efforts (however opaque) to
find substantive-due-process grounding for the liberty interest involved. However, Sunstein's
proposal cannot explain the Court's effort to establish the partial roll-back of sodomy laws
despite its failure to establish an absence of nationwide prosecutions over a relevant period (or
its failure to identify and defend the relevant desuetude period). Sunstein attempted to
sketch a "desuetude-type rationale" in which "[a] law might fit with existing social values in
one state, but those values might be rejected in the rest of the union," but recognized that
"[c]ertainly the standard desuetude idea cannot be invoked in a state in which the law in
question is actively enforced," and so limits his "emphasis .. . [to] the fact that in Texas
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The impression that desuetude has no appropriate place in the
American constitutional system does not stop at the Supreme
Court level. Numerous additional courts have rejected the notion
that desuetude can render current enforcement unconstitutional
from long disuse. Most often, these objections "rest[] upon the
proposition that the executive branch of government cannot nulli-
fy an act of the legislative branch by failure to enforce, any more
than it can effect a repeal by direct fiat."201
In addition to lacking any fixed constitutional location or
anything resembling even grudging or fleeting recognition from
the Supreme Court or most lower courts, constitutional desuetude
suffers as well from the amorphous character of its content.202 As
noted above, Professor Bonfield's constitutional desuetude lacks
concrete standards; desuetude would occur when the disuse of a
provision has demonstrated "clear and conscious administrative
policy of total nonenforcement," and has been "protracted enough
to establish a reasonable public expectation that the conduct
involved will no longer be punished."z2o These standards, though,
introduce significant difficulties inherent in "knowing" the hearts
and minds of the administrators or the public.2 0 Given
prosecutorial interest in maintaining a sweeping remit, prosecutors
will likely prove uniquely unwilling to admit that any quiescence in
enforcement, however long, represents "a clear and conscious
administrative policy of total nonenforcement," and hence an
abandonment of their future discretion to enforce again.205
itself, the sodomy statute, hardly ever enforced, created problems of both unpredictability
and arbitrariness." Sunstein, supra note 167, at 54-55. In short, there is much in Lawrence
that cannot be made to cohere under any recognizable theory of desuetude, even of desue-
tude + important interest.
201. John R. Thompson Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 203 F.2d 579, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1953),
rev'd, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Bonfield, supra note 136, at 428-30 (detailing the general-
ly negative state-court response to desuetude, and such courts' use of separation-of-powers-
based arguments); Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 169, at 2-4, 14-19 (describing American
judicial quiescence in the face of enforcement of long-disused statutes, and common objec-
tions to the desuetude doctrine-particularly the claim that the desuetude doctrine would
result in judicial intrusion into the legislative sphere).
202. See, e.g., J.R. Philip, Some Reflections on Desuetude, 43 JURID. REv. 260, 266 (1931);
Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 169, at 29 (noting and objecting to the "perpetual uncertain-
ty as to the rules" of desuetude that characterize Bonfield's and other desuetude proposals).
203. Bonfield, supra note 136, at 419.
204. Cf Stuntz, Civil-Crimina4 supra note 167, at 36 ("Separating strategic from nonstra-
tegic arrests or prosecutions involves the same sort of inquiry as so-called 'pretext search'
claims-it requires the court to look behind the formal charges to determine the govern-
ment's motive, a hard thing to do successfully. That is one reason why pretext search
doctrine exists only in law review articles; the cases routinely repudiate any inquiry into the
reasons why the police searched or arrested.").
205. Id. ("[Any rule that turns on government motives encourages government offi-
cials to claim whatever motive is legally protected.").
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Prosecutors would gain nothing, and lose power, by such an
admission. Similarly, while it seems relatively easy to demonstrate a
significant train of violation of any given enactment, difficulties of
proof are multiplied extensively if a declaration of desuetude
hinges not only on demonstrations of objective acts of multiple
violation, but on establishment of the subjective, plural, large-
group recognition of the desuetude of an individual statute.
The difficulties of these subjective determinations underscore
the lack of objective measures in Bonfield's desuetude structure. If
Bonfield's model follows Professor Bickel in addressing desuetude
only to those "statute[s] that ha[ve] never been enforced and that
ha[ve] not been obeyed for three quarters of a century,, 206 then it is
doomed to have little practical effect. It seems that Bonfield actual-
ly intended something more robust, including shorter desuetude
periods for "more notorious and widespread" forms of violation,207
but he provided no metrics.
Indeterminacy similarly shoots straight through Sunstein's desu-
etude-plus-important-interest formulation. Sunstein leaves un-
defined the period required to achieve the desuete prong of his
formulation, except to suggest that it must be long enough to
demonstrate that the "criminal prosecution is brought on the basis
of moral judgments lacking public support."20s This formulation
raises the sort of subjectivity problems raised by Bonfield's pro-
posals, along with the difficulty of differentiating between public
conclusions based on "moral judgments" rather than, presumably,
judgments based in expediency or other considerations. The in-
quiry truly enters the morass, however, when Sunstein attempts to
flesh out the content of "important constitutional interests." De-
spite significant effort, he finds it difficult to establish with any
certainty even the important interest that he thought had been
vindicated by his American-style desuetude in Lawrence itself,20 and
his limited attempt to establish principles by which an important
constitutional interest might generally be identified proves part
dodge, part boot strap.1 0 Can Supreme Court justices meaningfully
and coherently declare, as Sunstein tentatively suggests, that con-
sensual-but-casual sex between consenting adults constitutes, as a
constitutional matter, an interest sufficiently important to be sub-
ject to desuetude analysis, but consensual-but-casual sex between
206. BICKEL, supa note 167, at 148.
207. Bonfield, supra note 136, at 421.
208. Sunstein, supra note 167, at 27-28.
209. See id at 60-72.
210. See supra note 185.
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consenting adults that involves payment does not?2 1' Would the
principle thatjustifies such a distinction also justify allowing home-
grown marijuana enjoyed in the family home to fall within desue-
tude analysis, but not privately purchased product?212 On what
basis-whether yea or nay? Without agreed and anchored guiding
principles, these determinations threaten to devolve into nothing
more than an assertion of individual justices' subjective policy
preferences, in which case the application of American-style desue-
tude becomes just as much of a lottery as the rare-enforcement
lottery that Sunstein offers his formulation as a strategy for avoid-
ing.1 Of course, these difficulties are not unique to Sunstein's
formulation; they arise any time constitutional determinations of
fundamental rights arise.1 This problem of enunciating funda-
mental principle may explain the Court's long retreat from
substantive due process and Sunstein's own attempt to develop a
theory of Lawrence that more fully implicates "procedural due pro-
cess, rather than the clause's substantive sibling."2 16  Because
Sunstein's formulation of desuetude requires threshold determina-
tion of the constitutional importance of the activities prohibited by
the potentially desuete statute, however, the formulation necessari-
ly encompasses those problems.
211. See Sunstein, supra note 167, at 62 ("The more basic claim must be that special
constitutional status attaches to sexual intimacy, not to sexual relationships, and that intima-
cy in the relevant sense is not involved when sex is exchanged for cash. Hence no
fundamental right is involved. To be sure, this argument is not entirely convincing. Many
sexual relationships (including many that fall within the category protected by Lawrence) do
not involve intimacy (except by definition)." (footnotes omitted)).
212. See id. at 51. Sunstein raises the possibility, but provides no principled means by
which to answer it.
213. See id. at 59 ("To be sure, the effect of a rarely enforced law is similar to that of a
lottery, and in that respect there is a degree of ex ante equality. But that's the problem.
Criminal punishments should not operate like lotteries.").
214. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965) ("Coming to the
merits, we are met with a wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Overtones of some arguments suggest that Lochner v. New York
should be our guide. But we decline that invitation as we did in [cases such as West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish]. We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and
propriety of laws that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions. This
law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physi-
cian's role in one aspect of that relation." (citations omitted)).
215. See Sunstein, supra note 167, at 37-38 (noting that with regard to substantive due
process, "since Bowers, or at least since Washington v Glucksberg, the Court has said something
like this: 'Thus far, but no further!' Since 1985, the Court has been extremely reluctant to
use the idea of substantive due process to strike down legislation, and before Lawrence, the
Court seemed unwilling to add to the list even if the logic of prior cases suggested that it
ought to do so." (footnotes omitted)).
216. Id. at 28.
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2. Adverse-Possession-Based Desuetude
Siting a non-constitutional desuetude doctrine in an expanded
notion of adverse possession solves many of these problems. Most
fundamentally, it provides a firm location for desuetude within the
American legal system. Adverse possession, unlike desuetude, does
not stand "contrary to every principle of American or English
common law" ;2 it is an ancient and respected feature of that law.
And while most governments in the United States still cling to
nullum tempus in many adverse-possession contexts, those govern-
ments' abandonment of the outdated doctrine would hardly
violate well-settled principle; rather it would bring adverse-
possession into line with modern practice generally.218 Applying
adverse possession law to government would almost by logical dic-
tate, when considered in concert with the public-prescription
principle, permit extension of the doctrine to the restriction and
recovery by the public of property interests less than that of com-
plete ownership that have been acquired by government by, for
example, zoning laws." If, as suggested above, the principle at the
heart of adverse possession is one of abandonment and recap-
220
ture, then the sole short step remaining to complete the process
of anchoring desuetude (which embraces the same abandonment-
and-recapture principle) firmly in American common law is the
recognition that government can both make and abandon claims
against the liberty interests of its citizens just as it makes and aban-
dons claims against their property interests (or, alternatively, that
the claims are really all of the same timber) .221
The very non-constitutionality of adverse-possession-based desu-
etude ("AP desuetude") provides benefits. The Supreme Court has
often explained the desirability of avoiding constitutional determi-
nations if other grounds for decision are available.22m A
217. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 511 (1961) (Douglas,J., dissenting).
218. See supra Part II (discussing the anachronistic nature of retention of nullum tempus
in the adverse-possession context).
219. See supra Part 1IIA (discussing the interplay between adverse possession and zon-
ing and related regulation).
220. See supra Part I (discussing a proposed abandonment-and-recapture basis of ad-
verse possession).
221. See supra note 100 (quotingJames Madison's discussion of the expansive nature of
property interests).
222. See, e.g., Ullman, 367 U.S. at 503 ("'The Court [has] developed, for its own govern-
ance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has
avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for
decision.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring))). The Ullman Court focused on the question of
whether the facts before it presented a sufficiently adversarial posture in which to determine
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constitutional rule of desuetude obviously provides no opportunity
to avoid resolution on constitutional grounds. AP desuetude, on
the other hand, would serve exactly that purpose. As the Supreme
Court noted in Lawrence, Texas admitted in 1994 that it had never
previously enforced its anti-sodomy statute against consenting
adults acting in private.2 23 If this pattern of non-enforcement con-
tinued until the Lawrence case arose, the Texas courts may well have
found that the statute," enacted in 1973" and never relevantly
enforced, had died the death of desuetude by the time Texas at-
tempted its first enforcement against Lawrence and his
companion.2 Had it, then there would have been no constitution-
al case for the Supreme Court to decide. If the Court was correct
that " [i] n those States where sodomy is still proscribed, whether for
same-sex or heterosexual conduct," meanwhile, "there is a pattern of
nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in pri-
vate,""2 then AP desuetude would have pushed the "demean [ing]"
specter of such laws being applied in such circumstances entirely
from the American legal scene on non-constitutional grounds. And
if the Ullman majority correctly characterized Connecticut's long
the constitutionality of the Connecticut contraception statute, but Justice Brandeis' explica-
tion of the restrictions by which the Court limits its constitutional interventions extended
much more broadly, to include these admonitions relevant to the advisability of non-
constitutional desuetude:
2. The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of
the necessity of deciding it....
3. The Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is re-
quired by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground up-
on which the case may be disposed of....
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-47 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted) (citations
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
223. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
224. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003).
225. 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 917.
226. Because the defendants in Lawrence pleaded nolo contendere, "the facts and circum-
stances" of the arrest, including its date, were not included in the state-court record.
Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (en banc). The arrest ap-
pears, however, to have occurred on September 17, 1998. Hendrik Hertzberg, Unnatural
Law, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 16, 2002, at 33,. If this arrest represented the first relevant
application of the anti-sodomy statute in its nearly twenty-five years on the statute books,
then AP desuetude would have rendered the statute desuete under all but one of Texas'
adverse-possession limitations periods, and only a few months shy of desuetude under the
longest. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.024-.027 (West 2002) (codifying three,
five, ten, and twenty-five year periods).
227. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
228. Id. at 575.
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failure to enforce its contraceptive statutes (i.e., finding that the
state had never enforced the law against married couples since its
enactment in 1879129), then AP desuetude would similarly have re-
solved that case on non-constitutional grounds.
As a practical matter, AP desuetude would achieve the same kind
of results as were achieved in cases like Lawrence and Griswold, with
much less uncertainty-and possibly with much greater speed and
consistency. Some might argue that the result in Lawrence-a decla-
ration from the Supreme Court that criminal prohibitions of
sodomy violate the U.S. Constitution-encourages claims based on
constitutional grounds. For every Lawrence, though, there may be a
Bowers 0 (or vice versa, for those who prefer the latter decision to
the former), especially given the Court's reticence to expand fun-
damental-rights jurisprudence and the potential randomness of
deviations from that reticence.23 ' Additionally, it is the very rare
state court case that rises to the U.S. Supreme Court for federal
constitutional review, while all state court cases would be subject to
non-constitutional desuetude review (and all federal cases to the
same review-of right-in federal district and appellate court) .
The non-constitutional nature of AP desuetude, along with the
mechanisms that adverse possession itself provides, allow this form
of desuetude to avoid many of the indeterminacies that have ham-
pered proposed constitutional versions. First, because AP
desuetude lacks a constitutional foundation, it escapes the confu-
sion of fundamental-rights and substantive-due-process doctrine.
Courts need not determine whether the liberty (or property) in-
terest withdrawn by any given statute constitutes a "constitutionally
important interest" before employing desuetude analysis. Instead,
the court simply measures whether the public has flouted the gov-
ernment's claim to have denied the liberty interest (i.e., violated
229. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 501-02 (1961) (noting that the Connecticut con-
traception law had never been enforced against anyone except in a single test case that was
ultimately abandoned by state prosecutors). But see Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 169, at 8
n.48 (quoting a letter from counsel for plaintiff in Ullman indicating that "[o]nly one who
ha[d] not lived in Connecticut could have thought that there was any conscious refusal to
prosecute tinder the birth control statute").
230. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy stat-
ute), overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
231. See supra notes 208-216 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of clear prin-
ciples supporting a desuetude doctrine that relies on concepts of fundamental rights).
232. Cf Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 169, at 12 ("[IHf statutes are enforced intermit-
tently, the burden of establishing discrimination becomes prohibitive, for this form of
prosecutorial persecution is not likely to be sufficiently visible or demonstrable to reveal the
real necessity for a check. It is here that the possibility of at least a marginal form of relief by




the enactment) in a public manner over the requisite period.2 3 3 If it
has, and if the executive branch has acquiesced in the public's
"trespassing" on the governmental claim throughout the period,
then the people have adversely possessed their liberty interest, and
the government's discretion further to restrict the liberty interest
under the original enactment has lapsed. Under AP desuetude,
enforcement authorities and the public jointly determine the "im-
portance" or moral soundness of the liberty interest in question by
their decisions about whether to enforce and to violate the prohi-
bition, respectively. The courts need only acknowledge the result.
AP desuetude similarly dispenses with the need to make a sepa-
rate evaluation of whether failure to prosecute over a given period
arises as a demonstration of "a clear and conscious administrative
policy of total nonenforcement," or of "a reasonable public expec-
tation that the conduct involved will no longer be punished."2 3 4
Rather, failure to enforce over the relevant statutory period in the
face of open and notorious violations of the restriction on liberty
would result in a conclusive determination in two parts. First, the
prosecutorial powers had exercised their discretion not to restrict
the liberty interest for so long that they had abandoned the claim
to be able to enforce the restriction again in future. Second, the
public had re-captured the liberty interest inherent in enjoying the
right to undertake the conduct in future free of threat of prosecu-
tion.
Both the nature of AP desuetude and the steps necessary for its
invigoration go some distance in answering the separation-of-
powers concerns that have always clung to other explications of the
desuetude doctrine.2 First, in order for AP desuetude to develop,
governments that have enacted nullum tempus by statute2 3 6 will have
to repeal or amend those provisions, thus expressly demonstrating
legislative approval for applying the process of abandonment and
recapture to government as well as to private citizens. Only where
courts apply nullum tempus merely by convention rather than
statutory obligation could the process of evolution toward AP
desuetude begin without overt legislative assistance.3 Of course,
233. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the mechanics of AP desuetude in greater detail).
234. Bonfield, supra note 136, at 419.
235. See supra note 201 and accompanying text (discussing separation-of-powers con-
cerns).
236. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1068 (2006) (permitting private-party adverse possession of
federal lands under claim or color of title-albeit only at the discretion of the Secretary of
the Interior; implicitly rejecting adverse possession in other contexts).
237. Cff Cont'l Oil Co. v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 148 F. Supp. 411, 418 (D. Wyo. 1957) ("It
is a general and accepted rule of law that title by prescription or adverse possession can not
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legislatures could directly facilitate the development of desuetude,
under the aegis of adverse-possession doctrine or otherwise, by
238
explicit statutory authorization, but none has done so.
Additionally, while the separation-of-powers objection to desuetude
has always been something of a red herring, it is particularly so
when applied to AP desuetude." Until the prescriptive period
runs, the administrators charged with enforcing the relevant
statutory restriction of course enjoy discretion about when,
whether, and how to enforce the restriction.240 Under AP
desuetude, failure to enforce in the face of notorious violation will
result in the return of the liberty interest-i.e., the right to
undertake the conduct without fear of prosecution or other
governmental interference-to the public, which will have the
practical effect of foreclosing executive discretion to prosecute in
the future. In other words, the exercise vel non of executive
authority at one period will potentially constrain the exercise of
that same executive's authority at another period. The courts will
judge whether the executive has behaved in a manner sufficient to
cause that restraint to arise. Neither the executive nor the courts
will have legislated at any point. The enactment claiming to
withdraw relevant liberty interests from the public will remain on
the books, and will continue to exert the precatory power that
unenforced statutes are sometimes thought to wield. Of course, it
be acquired against the state unless specifically permitted by statute. We have no such stat-
ute. This principle of law is well settled in Wyoming." (citations omitted)).
238. This despite the provision of a blueprint for just such legislation as long ago as
1966. See Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 169, at 25-28 (proposing a revision to the Model
Penal Code which would explicitly have embraced the desuetude doctrine).
239. As the D.C. Circuit Court put the objection, "the executive branch of government
cannot nullify an act of the legislative branch by failure to enforce."John R. Thompson Co.
v. District of Columbia, 203 F.2d 579, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1953), rev'd, 346 U.S. 100 (1953). But of
course it can. So long as the executive branch has discretion not to enforce, it can "nullify" a
legislative act just by setting its discretionary enforcement level at zero. Why holding the
executive branch to a longstanding pattern of discretionary non-enforcement transforms
that non-enforcement into a legislative, rather than an executive, act has never been terribly
clear. See generally Ronald J. Allen, The Police and Substantive Rulemaking. Reconciling Principle
and Expediency, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 62, 81-86 (1976) (expanding on the separation-of-powers
theme); Desuetude, supra note 118, at 2220-25 (sketching the delegation of criminal law-
making authority to prosecutors).
240. See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 136, at 414-17 (discussing prosecutorial discretion);
Desuetude, supra note 118, at 2220-25 (sketching the delegation of criminal law-making au-
thority to prosecutors).
241. See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 136, at 391 ("[Iln some cases it may be that 'unen-
forced criminal laws survive [on the statute books] in order to satisfy moral objections to
established modes of conduct. They are unenforced because we want to continue our con-
duct, and unrepealed because we want to preserve our morals.'" (quoting THURMAN W.
ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 160 (1935))); Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 169,
at 15; Sunstein, supra note 167, at 59 ("One purpose of the criminal law is to impose expres-
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will in most instances probably be wiser for the legislature to repeal
the now-defunct restriction, in the same way and for the same
reasons that it is best, upon the running of the statutory period, for
formal title to pass from the original owner to the de facto owner
of a property who has taken claim by adverse possession. In some
instances, though, the legislature may well wish to enact a new
version of the restriction, perhaps drawn in a somewhat different
form, and perhaps including provisions for non-discretionary
enforcement or dedicated enforcement resources, if it concludes
that executive branch discretionary non-enforcement, now
hardened into non-discretionary non-enforcement, failed to do the
will of the legislature. 2 Either way, though, all legislative authority,
and all legislative action, will have remained in the proper locale.43
3. The Mechanics of AP Desuetude
The liberty interests at stake in the AP desuetude process closely
resemble the property-use interests at stake in prescriptive-
easement law and in the zoning process; the adverse-possession
model best suited for adoption in this context is thus the prescrip-
tive-easement model. As discussed above, that model looks to the
"actual, open, notorious [and] hostile ... use" of the relevant
interest for the statutory period, with the "continuous" and "exclu-
sive" elements of classic adverse possession having specialized and
limited meaning.2" Thus, the relevant inquiries for the adverse
possession of liberty interests against the government will be the
following.
* Has the public actually "used" the liberty interest by violat-
ing the government's attempt to restrict that liberty by
statute? The starting point for both adverse posses-
sion and desuetude analysis is whether the
restricted property or liberty interest is being used
by the public. If a restriction on liberty goes long
unenforced because it goes long un-violated, desue-
tude is not implicated. Thus, for instance, decades
sive condemnation ... [with] the social judgment ... in favor of expressive condemnation
but opposed to much in the way of actual prosecution.").
242. Cf. infra text accompanying notes 251-252 (discussing "partial-statute desuetude").
243. See Chivers, supra note 167, passimn see also id. at 489 (showing that the separation-
of-powers problem dissolves upon recognition that the desuetude doctrine "do [es] not re-
quire the abrogation of a statute but rather prevent[s] its application" and enforcement).
244. See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 8.7, at 451-52, 455-56; supra Part IIA
(discussing elements of prescriptive easements and of adverse possession in the regulato-
ry/zoning context).
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might go by without anyone being so reckless as to
store nuclear waste on private property. As a result,
of course, a statute that forbade such behavior
would go unexercised, but prosecutors would not
lose the authority to enforce it.m
* Has the public's use-by-violation been open and notoious?
The inquiry here cannot, or at least cannot always,
be one of whether the public violates the restriction
on Main Street at noontime. Some restrictions, such
as those at issue in Lawrence, obviously do not lend
themselves to public violation. Rather, the inquiry
should be whether common violation of the re-
striction is common knowledge and susceptible to
judicial notice, or to establishment by commonly
publicly available evidence. Thus, for instance, the
existence throughout Texas of substantial gay com-
munities, without more, would have permitted the
conclusion that the conduct Texas had restricted
was occurring regularly in the state, and that the
public and enforcement officials were generally
aware that such conduct was occurring even if it was
not occurring in public view. Similarly, the ready
availability of birth control in Connecticut pharma-
cies, and the facility with which couples could
import such items into Connecticut, perhaps cou-
pled with a widespread failure of young families to
grow at a rate consistent with strict adherence to the
anti-birth-control restrictions, would have been
enough to establish open and notorious violation of
that restriction.
As will be discussed in more detail below,'2 4 how
much of any given restriction will fall desuete for
non-enforcement will depend in large part on the
scope of the behavior that can be established as
245. It follows from this that neither AP desuetude nor any other doctrine of desuetude
would provide a useful vehicle for eliminating the vast array of restrictions that remain on
the books but which modern conditions or mores have rendered irrelevant. Desuetude will
not render these enactments desuete because, presumably, no one will have violated them
throughout the relevant period. While AP desuetude will do some of the work of a careful
legislature, it cannot wholly absolve representatives of their (long-abjured) duty of legislative
care. Of course, these obsolete restrictions, though perhaps embarrassing, present no real
threat, since there can be no surprise prosecutions against behavior in which no one is en-
gaging.
246. See infra text accompanying notes 251-252.
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openly and notoriously undertaken without prose-
cution.
* Has the public's use-by-violation been hostile? By way of
reminder, hostility in the adverse-possession
context means "without the record owner's per-
mission."2 4 In the AP desuetude context, the liber-
liberty-restricting government is the analog of the
record owner, the violating public analogous to the
trespassing user. To satisfy the hostility element,
the violations of the restriction that arise must not
be with the permission of the government (e.g., by
smoking marijuana as part of a permitted govern-
ment study), at the government's behest (e.g.,
while serving in government employ), or otherwise
receive the explicit sanction of government. Any
"implicit sanction" arising from a recognized pat-
tern of non-enforcement, of course, would not
defeat the hostility requirement.
Meanwhile, though, it matters not whether a
statute goes unenforced because prosecutors do not
wish to bring the charge or because they lack the
resources to prosecute all of the things that have
been rendered criminal by the legislature.248 In the
standard adverse-possession context, an inability of
government to undertake even minimal monitoring
of its holdings provides, as discussed above, a
demonstration that government's aspirations and
expenditures are so seriously and problematically
mismatched as to require abandonment. Similarly,
in the AP desuetude context, the failure of the legis-
lature to provide sufficient resources to allow
prosecution of its ever-metastasizing criminal and
regulatory codes does not excuse the legislature
from the consequences of its failure to match its
wishes with reality, but rather represents a failure by
the legislature to develop coherent policy, and an
abandonment to executive discretion and popular
self-expression of the determination of which
247. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 8.7, at 453; see also Cameron v. Barton, 272
S.W.2d 40, 41 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954).
248. See Chivers, supra note 167, at 461 ("[I]t would seem inappropriate for the judici-
ary to repeal such laws as certain drug misdemeanors or petty theft laws simply because
enforcers cannot spend the resources to enforce them.").
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portions of its aspirations will be fulfilled with the
resources it can provide.
* Has the public's use-by-violation been continuous? For
prescriptive easements, use need not be literally
continuous-as such a standard would be
incoherent 2 4 9-but merely "as continuous ... a
frequency of use [as] is normal for the kind of
easement claimed."250 In the AP desuetude context
this would require not perpetual violation of the
restriction throughout the statutory period, but
merely regular and on-going violation consistent
with the nature of the restriction and the violation.
Thus it would be insufficient to demonstrate that
one person had once smoked marijuana in her
home and that her conduct was public knowledge,
or even to show a few such occurrences over a
period of years. If, however, it could be
demonstrated (perhaps by demonstrating the
quantity of marijuana imported into the
jurisdiction) that hundreds of thousands of joints
had been smoked in private locales throughout the
statutory period, continuity would have been
demonstrated.
* Has the use-by-violation been exclusive? With regard to
prescriptive easements, the exclusivity element
merely requires that the record owner's actions do
not interfere with the trespasser's use of the proper-
ty. This element is fulfilled for AP desuetude by the
failure of the relevant authorities to prosecute any
relevant violations during the statutory period. Even
a single completed prosecution should be enough
to defeat exclusivity and to demonstrate the contin-
uing vitality of the prosecutorial discretion to
enforce.
The exclusivity element raises the question of scope: whether vi-
olations should qualify for AP desuetude consideration even if they
are narrower than the extent of the potentially desuete restriction
as enacted. Allowing portions of criminal enactments to fall desue-
249. If the prescription were for a right-of-way, for instance, demanding continuous use
of the right of way throughout the years of the prescriptive period would render prescrip-
tion both impossible and ludicrous.
250. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 1, § 8.7, at 456 (citing Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes v. Vulles, 437 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1971)).
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te does introduce some theoretical measure of indeterminacy into
the AP desuetude analysis, but in reality judges will be able to de-
termine the portion of the statute rendered desuete by simple and
familiar determinations of germaneness. In the sodomy-law
context, for instance, "consenting adults acting in private" is a
germane distinction, which, if supported by the evidence, should
permit a declaration of desuetude of the restriction in those cir-
cumstances. Evidence that enforcement against private parties had
occurred during the statutory period, but that no enforcement had
occurred on (say) Tuesdays, would fail on germaneness grounds.m
(The presence or absence of a commercial transaction presents a
similarly germane distinction.) The alternative-to declare laws
desuete only when no enforcement of the entire statutory provision
in any context had occurred-would ensure that neither Uliman
nor Lawrence would have been resolved, and very few other cases
would either. 2 Moreover, permitting desuetude of less than an
251. Cf Sunstein, supra note 167, at 49-50 (considering such distinctions).
252. Professor Forde-Mazrui worries that
[a] doctrine of desuetude would afford some protection to people against the arbi-
trary invocation of a law that is virtually never enforced, . . . but it would do little to
address the common use of speeding and other low-level traffic laws for drug en-
forcement or public order policing, including pursuing these enforcement objectives
in a discriminatory manner.
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 169, at 1544 (citation omitted). This concern would surely carry
great force if desuetude could only arise if the whole of a restriction went unenforced
throughout the prescriptive period; surely speeding stops of some sort, for instance, will
always be made every day. If germane distinctions of enforcement within a given restriction
are permitted, however, then Forde-Mazrui's concern is significantly mitigated. While speed-
ing enforcement will occur every day, speeding enforcement against drivers going only a few
miles over the speed limit on open roads, that lead to searches, interrogations, and arrest on
unrelated charges should-one surely hopes--occur with significantly less frequency. Accord
Stuntz, Civil-Crimina4 supra note 167, at 36 ("Now suppose the state could point to cases that
began as sexual assault or public indecency arrests and ended with guilty pleas to sodomy. If
this amounts to regular enforcement justifying enforcement in all circumstances], any
desuetude doctrine is pointless-the idea must be to require regular nonstrategic enforce-
ment, enforcement aimed at the conduct specified in the crime rather than at something
else."). Professor Stuntz is worried particularly about pretextual prosecution, "as where a
contestable sexual assault case leads to a guilty plea of sodomy." WilliamJ. Stuntz, The Uneasy
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 68 (1997). An AP
desuetude supple enough to make germaneness distinctions should catch many of these
pretextual cases. Assume that the prohibition of consensual, private sodomy has been ren-
dered desuete by non-enforcement. Now arises this arrest for "contestable sexual assault."
Prosecutors could bring a non-pretextual charge of sexual assault. Or they could bring the
pretextual claim of sodomy. It would no longer be sufficient, however, to prove simple sod-
omy in order to earn a conviction. Rather, prosecutors would have to prove some level of
non-consensuality (or some other aggravating factor) to take the sodomy charge out of the
area of desuetude. Of course, prosecutors might attempt to defeat the slide of consensual,
private sodomy into desuetude by bringing prosecutions on those grounds alone within
every prescriptive period, but this defense mechanism will unavoidably be available against
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enactment's full reach is consistent with adverse-possession theory.
A trespasser is not required to invade and occupy the whole of a
property-owner's land or goods; rather, she can trespass on and use
just a portion of the property, and thereby gain title to the portion
properly possessed.
On the other hand, it seems wholly unworkable to permit AP
desuetude to work in favor of any specific individual or set of indi-
viduals without applying to the whole of the general public. As a
practical matter, the nature of AP desuetude makes it much less
likely that individuals would often qualify for consideration. They
would personally have to violate the relevant restriction continuous-
ly throughout the period in a manner that would make their own
violations open and notorious to the authorities. This should occur
but rarely; and were it to occur, it would demonstrate not that
the individual(s) had accrued a rightful expectation of non-
interference (for, among other things, there are no such things as
variances or waivers in the context of criminal statutes) but instead
that willful and selective non-enforcement had occurred; and this,
of course, is merely a different species of the arbitrary and selective
enforcement that AP desuetude (and all desuetude doctrine) is
designed in large part to avert.
A final issue that arises in the desuetude literature (but would
apply as well in the regulatory-restriction context considered in
section III.A) is what sort of legislative re-enactment of a restriction
on liberty (or property) interests should qualify to "recharge" the
restriction so that it might be considered renewed and amenable
to future enforcement as a new restriction. Professor Bonfield
suggests that re-enactment of a restrictive provision as part of a
broader re-enactment of a jurisdiction's "general statutory compi-
lations" should trigger such a renewal, but that "the period
required to [re-]abrogate such a re-enacted dead-letter act by sub-
sequent nonenforcement may be appreciably reduced because of
the community's awareness of its prior history."25' Those who reject
any doctrine of desuetude, given that the doctrine is premised on a demonstration of long-
standing non-enforcement. For the "defense" to work, however, the prosecutors will have
to actually earn a conviction during each period-pleading and proving only the innocu-
ous facts (e.g., consensual, private sexual activity). The liberty restriction on consensual
sodomy will remain enforceable, and the prosecutors will remain in office, only if the
public acquiesces in the enforcement on those grounds (by not demanding change from
their public officials and/or voting them out).
253. See supra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing the need, in the interest of
justice, for a process by which to declare statutes desuete).
254. See, e.g., Bonfield, supra note 136, at 438; Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 169, at 15-
17.
255. Bonfield, supra note 136, at 438.
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the organic power of the desuetude doctrine of course reject this
argument as well.2 5' Bonfield's conclusion here once again prob-
lematically relies on evaluations of actual, subjective community
awareness. The answer best suited to AP desuetude is that general
re-enactments do not represent the focus of any legislative atten-
tion on the specific restriction that has been rendered desuete; in
fact, it perpetuates exactly the sort of (benign or malign) neglect
that had caused the desuetude in the first place. Only specific and
individualized re-enactment of a desuete statute should properly
qualify to renew authority to enforce the restriction (or those parts
of it which had been rendered desuete) .
CONCLUSION
Adverse possession makes sense (perhaps only) when under-
stood as a process of abandonment and recapture. Whether
understood in that light or otherwise, the tradition of protecting
government from the positive benefits offered by the doctrine has
long since grown inappropriate, and must be rejected. Embrace of
256. See, e.g., Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 169, at 15-17.
257. As this exposition suggests, AP desuetude would follow Professor Bonfield in his
conclusion that once a statute (or relevant portion thereof) became desuete, a declaration
of intent by prosecutors to begin enforcing it again at some future date-certain, thus provid-
ing the populace fair notice of future enforcement, would have no effect whatever; the
statute would remain desuete. Bonfield justified this conclusion on the grounds that prose-
cutorial re-invigoration would represent "an executive usurpation of legislative prerogative"
permitting "penal-law administrators ... to effectively create substantive criminal law." Bon-
field, supra note 136, at 422-23. The proposition rests on similar grounds when applied to
AP desuetude. As discussed above in this section, when non-enforcement triggers AP desue-
tude, the heretofore voluntary non-enforcement exhibited by prosecutors becomes
involuntary, the liberty or property interest at issue having been successfully adversely pos-
sessed by the public. The public has regained its interest and nothing in the executive power
can withdraw it again; only a legislative enactment may achieve such a feat. Rodgers &
Rodgers argue that Bonfield's position is "clearly wrong" because it is "squarely inconsistent
with that line of authority which permits a court, with no requirement of legislative re-
enactment, to retroactively reactivate a statute earlier held to have been unconstitutional."
Rodgers & Rodgers, supra note 169, at 18. The two cases are fundamentally dissimilar, how-
ever, at least with regard to AP desuetude. One of the fundamental duties of American
courts is to rule on the constitutionality of statutes. This duty arises each time they contem-
plate any given statute. If a court initiallyjudges a statute unconstitutional but later changes
its mind with regard to the same statute, it has each time performed one of its core func-
tions. Prosecutors and other executive-branch officials, on the other hand, do enjoy the
power of enforcing, and the discretion of not enforcing, enforceable restrictions against
citizens. If a restriction becomes unenforceable-whether because the legislature repeals it,
the courts rule it unconstitutional, or, as in AP desuetude, their own non-enforcement in
the face of widespread, open-and-notorious violation removes their ongoing discretion to
select enforcement rather than non-enforcement, and transfers the previously-restricted
interest back to the citizenry-there is no executive power by which the unenforceability can
be altered.
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these two conclusions reveals the deep structural connection be-
tween adverse possession and desuetude, and allows for the
recognition that adverse possession can provide a manner and
means by which citizens can recover to themselves property and
liberty interests taken from them by government enactment, as-
suming that the government fails to enforce these enactments in
the face of persistent public violations of coherent portions of their
provisions.
Many advantages flow from re-conceiving adverse possession in
this manner. Adverse possession serves fundamentally to redress
the improprieties and inefficiencies that arise from completely
negligent (or wholly absent) property owners maintaining a per-
manent ability to deny alternative uses (or attentive environmental
protections) to effectively abandoned properties. These improprie-
ties and inefficiencies accrue no less when property is held but
abandoned by government than when by private entities. The
whole public, and the quality of government with which the public
must deal, will benefit from the bracing tonic of the adverse-
possession doctrine applied to government property. As important,
however, are the advantages that arise from expanding the aban-
donment-and-recapture mechanism to embrace property and liberty
interests withdrawn from the public by government restriction.
Scholars have almost uniformly supported the introduction of desu-
etude doctrine into American law, lamenting only the lack of a
coherent basis for it and method of applying it. An expanded notion
of adverse possession provides that base and that mechanism, and
allows its easy expansion not only to criminal provisions, but to
regulatory restrictions as well.
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